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Compositional approaches to veriﬁcation offer a powerful means to address the challenge
of scalability. In this paper, we develop techniques for compositional veriﬁcation of
probabilistic systems based on the assume-guarantee paradigm. We target systems that
exhibit both nondeterministic and stochastic behaviour, modelled as probabilistic automata,
and augment these models with costs or rewards to reason about, for example, energy
usage or performance metrics. Despite signiﬁcant theoretical advances in compositional
reasoning for probabilistic automata, there has been a distinct lack of practical progress
regarding automated veriﬁcation. We propose a new assume-guarantee framework based
on multi-objective probabilistic model checking which supports compositional veriﬁcation
for a range of quantitative properties, including probabilistic ω-regular speciﬁcations and
expected total cost or reward measures. We present a wide selection of assume-guarantee
proof rules, including asymmetric, circular and asynchronous variants, and also show how
to obtain numerical results in a compositional fashion. Given appropriate assumptions
to be used in the proof rules, our compositional veriﬁcation methods are, in contrast
to previously proposed approaches, eﬃcient and fully automated. Experimental results
demonstrate their practical applicability on several large case studies, including instances
where conventional probabilistic veriﬁcation is infeasible.
© 2013 Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
1. Introduction
Many computerised systems exhibit probabilistic behaviour, for example due to the use of randomisation (e.g., in dis-
tributed communication or security protocols), or the presence of failures (e.g., in faulty devices or unreliable communication
media). The prevalence of such systems in today’s society makes techniques for their formal veriﬁcation a necessity. This
requires models and formalisms that incorporate both probability and nondeterminism. Although eﬃcient algorithms for veri-
fying such models are known [1–3] and mature tool support exists [4,5], applying these techniques to large, real-life systems
remains challenging, and hence techniques to improve scalability are essential.
In this paper, we focus on compositional veriﬁcation techniques for probabilistic and nondeterministic models, in which
a system comprising multiple interacting components can be veriﬁed by analysing each component in isolation, rather than
verifying the much larger model of the whole system. In the case of non-probabilistic models, a successful approach is
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“whenever component M is part of a system satisfying the assumption ΨA , then the system is guaranteed to satisfy prop-
erty ΨG ”. Proof rules can then be established to show, for example, that, if a component M1 satisﬁes assumption ΨA and
〈ΨA〉M2〈ΨG 〉 holds for a second component M2, then the combined system M1 ‖M2 satisﬁes ΨG .
For probabilistic systems, compositional approaches have also been studied, but a distinct lack of practical progress has
been made. In this paper, we present novel assume-guarantee techniques for compositional veriﬁcation of systems exhibiting
both probabilistic and nondeterministic behaviour, and illustrate their applicability and eﬃciency on several large case stud-
ies. This is the ﬁrst approach that, given appropriate assumptions about components, can perform compositional veriﬁcation
in an eﬃcient and fully-automated manner.
We use probabilistic automata (PAs) [8,9], a well-studied formalism that is naturally suited to modelling multi-component
probabilistic systems. We also augment PAs with rewards (or, dually, costs), which can be used to model a variety of quan-
titative measures of system behaviour, such as execution time or power consumption. We present compositional techniques
for veriﬁcation of a range of quantitative properties, including probabilistic ω-regular properties (which subsume, for exam-
ple, probabilistic LTL and probabilistic safety properties) and expected total reward/cost properties (which can also encode
the expected reward/cost to reach a target and time-bounded reward measures).
Probabilistic automata were developed as a formalism for the modelling and analysis of distributed, randomised systems
[8], and a rich underlying theory has been developed, in particular for models in which PAs are combined through par-
allel composition. A variety of elegant proof techniques have been created and used to manually prove the correctness of
large, complex randomised algorithms [10]. Key ingredients of the underlying theory of PAs include probabilistic versions
of strong and weak (bi)simulation [9] and trace distribution inclusion [8]. The branching-time preorders (simulation and
bisimulation) have been shown to be compositional [9] (i.e., preserved under parallel composition), but are often too ﬁne to
give signiﬁcant practical advantages for compositional veriﬁcation. Trace distribution inclusion, which is deﬁned in terms of
probability distributions over sequences of observable actions, is a natural generalisation of the (non-probabilistic) notion of
trace inclusion but is known not to be preserved under parallel composition [11]. Thus, other proposals for compositional
veriﬁcation frameworks based on PAs tend to restrict the forms of parallel composition that are allowed [12,13]. By con-
trast, the approach we present in this paper does not impose restrictions on the parallel composition permitted between
components, allowing greater ﬂexibility to model complex systems.
Our assume-guarantee framework uses multi-objective probabilistic model checking [14,15], which is a technique for
verifying multiple, possibly conﬂicting properties of a probabilistic automaton. Conventional veriﬁcation techniques for PAs
quantify over its adversaries, which represent the various different ways in which nondeterminism in the model can be
resolved. A typical property to be veriﬁed states, for example, “the probability of a system failure is at most 0.01, for
any possible adversary”. Multi-objective model checking, on the other hand, permits reasoning about the existence of an
adversary satisfying two or more distinct properties, for example, “is there an adversary under which the probability of a
system failure is at most 0.005 and the expected battery lifetime remains below 2 hours?”.
Our compositional approach to veriﬁcation is based on queries of the form 〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG 〉, with the meaning “under any
adversary of PA M for which assumption ΨA is satisﬁed, ΨG is guaranteed to hold”. The assumptions ΨA and guarantees
ΨG are quantitative multi-objective properties [15], which are conjunctions of predicates, each of which imposes a bound on
either the probability of an ω-regular property or the expected total value of some reward structure. A simple example of
an assumption is “with probability 1, component M1 eventually sends a request, and the expected time before this occurs
is at most 5 seconds”. We show that checking these assume-guarantee queries can be reduced to existing multi-objective
model checking techniques [14,15], which can be implemented eﬃciently using linear programming.
Building upon this notion of probabilistic assume-guarantee reasoning, we formulate and prove several compositional
proof rules, which can be used to decompose the process of verifying a multi-component probabilistic system into several
smaller sub-tasks. One important class of such proof rules is those that restrict assumptions and guarantees to be proba-
bilistic safety properties, which impose a bound on the probability of satisfying a regular safety property. These are slightly
cheaper to verify than the other properties we consider, but still represent a useful set of system properties. In order to
present proof rules for the more general class of quantitative properties (probabilistic ω-regular and expected total reward),
we incorporate a notion of fairness, restricting our analysis to cases where each component in a system executes a step
inﬁnitely often.
For both of these classes of properties, we present several different assume-guarantee proof rules, including variants
that are asymmetric (using assumptions only about one component) and circular (assumptions about all components).
We also give proof rules for systems with components that are asynchronous and methods to decompose the analysis of
reward-based properties. Finally, we describe how to obtain numerical results from compositional veriﬁcation, in particular,
obtaining lower and upper bounds on the actual probability that a system satisﬁes a property and constructing Pareto curves
to investigate trade-offs between multiple system properties in a compositional fashion.
We have implemented our assume-guarantee veriﬁcation techniques by extending the PRISM model checker [4], and
present experimental results from its application to several large case studies. We demonstrate signiﬁcant speed-ups over
conventional, non-compositional veriﬁcation, and also successfully verify models that are too large to be analysed without
compositional techniques.
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As mentioned above, there is a signiﬁcant body of work which develops the underlying theory, built upon in this pa-
per, for the compositional modelling and analysis of probabilistic systems. Segala and Lynch [8,9] proposed the model of
probabilistic automata, and deﬁned many key accompanying notions such as parallel composition, projections and various
compositional preorders, including strong and weak variants of probabilistic simulation and bisimulation. A number of com-
positional proof techniques were also developed and, in [10], applied to the manual veriﬁcation of Aspnes and Herlihy’s
randomised consensus algorithm.
There are several proposals for compositional veriﬁcation frameworks based on PAs. For example, de Alfaro et al. deﬁne
a probabilistic extension of Reactive Modules [16], which is restricted to synchronous parallel composition [12]. This allows
the formulation of assume-guarantee rules based on the use of trace distribution inclusion [8] which, in general, is not
compositional [11]. However, there is no known algorithm to check trace distribution inclusion and an implementation of
the techniques in [12] is not considered. An alternative approach is the formalism of switched probabilistic I/O automata
by Cheung et al. [13]. This distinguishes between local resolutions of nondeterminism by individual components, and the
global resolution of nondeterminism by a scheduler. The result is a framework which does allow compositional, traced-based
relations to be established between models. Again, though, practical implementations of the techniques are not developed.
This paper is an extended version of [17], which presented the ﬁrst fully-automated compositional veriﬁcation tech-
niques for probabilistic automata. That work focused speciﬁcally on the use of probabilistic safety properties; here, we give
methods to verify a much wider class of properties, some of which were originally introduced in [15]. This paper also draws
inspiration from several other sources. In particular, the fragment of our framework that deals with safety properties was
inspired by the large body of work by Giannakopoulou, Pasareanu et al. (see, e.g., [7]) on non-probabilistic assume-guarantee
techniques. We also build upon ideas put forward in [18], which suggests using multi-objective veriﬁcation for compositional
probabilistic veriﬁcation, but does not give a concrete proposal of how to achieve this.
The assume-guarantee techniques of [17] have also been extended with algorithmic learning methods [19,20], which
are used to automatically generate assumptions for performing compositional veriﬁcation. In recent work, an alternative
way to generate assumptions has been proposed in [21], based on the use of an abstraction-reﬁnement loop. In that work,
components, assumptions and properties are all modelled as probabilistic automata, with the relationships between them
captured by strong simulation [9]. Our work, by comparison, permits veriﬁcation for a more expressive class of quantitative
properties, including for example reward-based measures, and supports a wider range of compositional proof rules.
We also mention the development of compositional veriﬁcation techniques for other classes of models. One example
is the fully probabilistic setting, i.e., where models cannot exhibit nondeterministic behaviour. In [22], compositional tech-
niques are presented for probabilistic model checking of hardware systems modelled as discrete-time Markov chains. This
is based on a decomposition of the property to be checked and the use of conditional probabilities. In [23], a notion
of contracts is proposed for probabilistic systems with a limited degree of nondeterminism, i.e., a model that is less ex-
pressive than PAs. The authors consider additional operations over contracts, such as reﬁnement, but do not consider a
practical implementation of their approach. Moving away from probabilistic systems, [24] presents a theoretical framework
for compositional veriﬁcation of quantitative properties of labelled transition systems and [25] presents tool support for
compositional analysis of timed systems.
1.2. Paper structure
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the necessary background material regarding
probabilistic automata, including notions required for compositional methods such as parallel composition and projection.
Section 3 summarises the classes of properties of PAs that we use in this paper and techniques for their veriﬁcation. It also
covers the topics of multi-objective model checking and veriﬁcation of PAs under fairness constraints. Section 4 introduces
our assume-guarantee framework, deﬁning the basic underlying ideas and presenting instances of the two main classes of
compositional proof rules that we consider. Section 5 gives several additional proof rules and then Section 6 discusses how
our techniques can be adapted to produce numerical results. In Section 7, we describe an implementation of our techniques
and show results from its application to several large case studies. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. Probabilistic automata
We begin with some background material on probabilistic automata. In the following, we use Dist(S) to denote the set
of all discrete probability distributions over a set S , i.e. functions μ : S → [0,1] satisfying ∑s∈S μ(s) = 1. We use ηs for
the point distribution on s ∈ S and μ1 × μ2 ∈ Dist(S1 × S2) for the product distribution of μ1 ∈ Dist(S1) and μ2 ∈ Dist(S2),
deﬁned by μ1×μ2((s1, s2)) def= μ1(s1) ·μ2(s2). We also denote by SubDist(S) the set of sub-distributions over S , i.e. functions
μ : S → [0,1] satisfying ∑s∈S μ(s) 1.
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Probabilistic automata [8,9] are commonly used for modelling systems that exhibit both probabilistic and nondeter-
ministic behaviour. They are a slight generalisation of Markov decision processes.2 For the purposes of applying standard
probabilistic veriﬁcation techniques, the two models can often be treated identically; however, probabilistic automata are
particularly well suited to compositional modelling and analysis of probabilistic systems.
Deﬁnition 1 (PA). A probabilistic automaton (PA) is a tuple M= (S, s,αM, δM, L) where:
• S is a set of states and s ∈ S is an initial state;
• αM is an alphabet of action labels;
• δM ⊆ S × αM × Dist(S) is a probabilistic transition relation;
• L : S → 2AP is a labelling function mapping states to sets of atomic propositions taken from a set AP.
In any state s of a PA M, a transition, denoted s a−→ μ, where a is an action label and μ is a discrete probability distri-
bution over states, is available if (s,a,μ) ∈ δM . In an execution of the model, the choice between the available transitions
in each state is nondeterministic; the choice of successor state is then made randomly according to the distribution μ. For
presentational convenience elsewhere in the paper, we do not identify a special “silent” action τ , but this can easily be
added if required.
A path through M is a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sequence π = s0 a0,μ0−−−−→s1 a1,μ1−−−−→· · · where s0 = s and, for each i  0, si ai−→ μi
is a transition and μi(si+1) > 0. We denote by π(i) the (i + 1)th state si of π and by IPathsM (FPathsM) the set of all
inﬁnite (ﬁnite) paths in M. If π is ﬁnite, |π | denotes its length and last(π) its last state. The trace, tr(π), of π is the
sequence of actions a0a1 . . . and we use tr(π)α to indicate the projection of such a trace onto an alphabet α ⊆ αM .
To reason about PAs, we use the notion of adversaries (also called schedulers or strategies), which resolve the nondeter-
ministic choices in a model, based on its execution history.
Deﬁnition 2 (Adversary). An adversary of a PA M = (S, s,αM, δM, L) is given by a function σ : FPathsM → Dist(αM ×
Dist(S)) such that, for any ﬁnite path π of M, σ(π) only assigns non-zero probabilities to action-distribution pairs (a,μ)
for which (last(π),a,μ) ∈ δM .
Employing standard techniques [26], an adversary σ of a PA M induces a probability measure PrσM over IPathsM , which
captures the (purely probabilistic) behaviour of M when under the control of σ . We also use IPathsσM (FPathsσM) for the
set of inﬁnite (ﬁnite) paths of M under σ .
The set of all adversaries for PA M is denoted by AdvM . Amongst these, we distinguish several important classes.
An adversary σ is deterministic if σ(π) is a point distribution for all π , and randomised otherwise; σ is memoryless if
σ(π) depends only on last(π), and ﬁnite-memory if there are a ﬁnite number of memory conﬁgurations such that σ(π)
depends only on last(π) and the current memory conﬁguration, which is updated (possibly stochastically) when an action
is performed. We will also sometimes need to distinguish between partial and complete adversaries, which are discussed in
the next section.
We augment PAs with rewards, which will be used to capture a variety of quantitative properties of the systems that we
model. In this paper, we attach rewards to the transitions of a PA, according to the actions that label them.
Deﬁnition 3 (Reward structure). A reward structure for a PA M is a mapping ρ : αρ →R>0 from some alphabet αρ ⊆ αM to
the positive reals.
For an inﬁnite path π = s0 a0,μ0−−−−→ s1 a1,μ1−−−−→ · · · , the total reward for π over reward structure ρ is given by ρ(π) def=∑
i∈N∧ai∈αρ ρ(ai).
2.2. Parallel composition of PAs
To model and analyse probabilistic systems comprising multiple components, we need parallel composition of PAs. We
use the deﬁnition of [8,9], which is based on multi-way synchronisation over transitions with identical action labels, in the
style of the process algebra CSP.
Deﬁnition 4 (Parallel composition). Let M1,M2 be PAs such that Mi = (Si, si,αMi , δMi , Li) for i = 1,2. Their parallel
composition is the PA M1 ‖M2 = (S1× S2, (s1, s2),αM1∪αM2 , δM1‖M2 , L) where δM1‖M2 is deﬁned such that (s1, s2) a−→
μ1 × μ2 if and only if one of the following holds:
2 For Markov decision processes, the probabilistic transition relation of Deﬁnition 1 becomes a partial function δM : (S × αM) → Dist(S).
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Fig. 2. Parallel composition of PAs Ms,Md from Fig. 1 and a DFA AerrφG for a safety property φG .
• s1 a−→ μ1, s2 a−→ μ2 and a ∈ αM1 ∩ αM2 ;• s1 a−→ μ1, μ2 = ηs2 and a ∈ (αM1\αM2 );• μ1 = ηs1 , s2 a−→ μ2 and a ∈ (αM2\αM1 );
and L(s1, s2) = L1(s1) ∪ L2(s2). The atomic propositions used by the labelling functions (L1, L2 and L) are assumed to be
from some global set AP. In practice, the atomic propositions labelling the states of each individual PA are usually disjoint.
Example 1. Fig. 1 shows a pair of PAs, Ms and Md , which we will use as one of our running examples throughout the
paper. We draw each transition of a PA as a group of arrows, joined by an arc and annotated with its action. We label
individual arrows with their corresponding probabilities, but omit this information if the probability is 1. A short incoming
arrow denotes the initial state of the PA.
We model a system with two components, each corresponding to one of the PAs. Component Ms represents a sensor
which, upon detection of a system failure, issues instructions to other devices causing them to power down. Upon receipt
of the detect signal, it ﬁrst issues the warn signal followed by shutdown; however, with probability 0.2 it will fail to issue
the warn signal. Md represents a device which, given the shutdown signal, powers down correctly if it ﬁrst receives the
warn signal and otherwise only powers down correctly 90% of the time. The combined system, i.e. the parallel composition
Ms ‖Md of the two PAs, is shown in Fig. 2(a).
For compositional reasoning about PAs, we also require the notion of projections [8], used to decompose models that have
been constructed through parallel composition. First, for any state s = (s1, s2) of M1 ‖M2, the projection of s onto Mi ,
denoted by sMi , equals si . We extend this notation to distributions over the state space S1 × S2 of M1 ‖ M2 in the
standard manner. Next, for any (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) path π of M1 ‖M2, the projection of π onto Mi , denoted πMi , is the
path obtained from π by projecting each state of π onto Mi and removing all the actions not in αMi together with the
subsequent states. Notice that the projection of an inﬁnite path may be ﬁnite.
To deﬁne projections of adversaries, we ﬁrst need the notion of partial adversaries, which are functions that map ﬁnite
paths to sub-distributions over available transitions in the ﬁnal state of the path, rather than distributions. The interpretation
is that such an adversary can opt to (with some probability) take none of the available transitions and remain in the current
state. This generalises the normal deﬁnition of an adversary, which we will sometimes refer to as a complete adversary.
Deﬁnition 5 (Partial adversary). A partial adversary of a PA M= (S, s,αM, δM, L) is a function σ : FPathsM → SubDist(αM×
Dist(S)) such that, for any ﬁnite path π of M, σ(π) only assigns non-zero probabilities to action-distribution pairs (a,μ)
for which (last(π),a,μ) ∈ δM .
The probability space PrσM for a partial adversary σ is deﬁned in a similar manner as for a complete adversary. We use
AdvpartM to denote the set of all partial adversaries of M and sometimes, for consistency, use AdvcompM to refer to the set all
complete adversaries (i.e. AdvM).
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its projection onto one component may be partial. Later, in Section 3.5, we will show that, by restricting our attention to
fair adversaries, we can ensure that the projection of a complete adversary remains complete.
Deﬁnition 6 (Adversary projection). Let M1 and M2 be PAs and σ an adversary of M1 ‖M2. The projection of σ onto Mi ,
denoted σ Mi , is the (partial) adversary on Mi where, for any ﬁnite path πi of Mi and (last(πi),a,μi) ∈ δMi :
σ Mi (πi)(a,μi) =
∑{|PrσM1‖M2(π) · σ(π)(a,μ) | π ∈ FPathsσM1‖M2 ∧ πMi = πi ∧ μMi = μi|}
Pr
σMi
Mi (πi)
and, for a ﬁnite path π of M, PrσM(π) denotes PrσM({π ′ ∈ IPathsσM | π is a preﬁx of π ′}).
For any partial adversary σ of a PA M, a complete adversary σ ′ of M is called a completion of σ if σ(π)(a,μ) 
σ ′(π)(a,μ) for all paths π and action-distribution pairs (a,μ) of M. Any partial adversary always has at least one com-
pletion.
Finally, in this section, we deﬁne the notion of alphabet extension for a PA M. This operation ensures that all of the
actions from a set α are included in the alphabet of M and, for any new action a, adds an a-labelled self-loop to each state
of M.
Deﬁnition 7 (Alphabet extension). For any PA M= (S, s,αM, δM, L) and set of actions α, we extend the alphabet of M to α,
denoted M[α], as follows: M[α] = (S, s,αM ∪ α, δM[α], L) where δM[α] = δM ∪ {(s,a, ηs) | s ∈ S ∧ a ∈ α \ αM}.
3. Quantitative veriﬁcation of probabilistic automata
In this section, we describe how to specify and verify a variety of quantitative properties of probabilistic automata.
We also discuss multi-objective probabilistic model checking and veriﬁcation under both partial and fair adversaries.
3.1. Specifying properties of PAs
There are various different ways of formally specifying properties of PAs for the purposes of veriﬁcation. In this paper,
we focus primarily on linear-time, action-based properties (i.e those deﬁned in terms of the action labels attached to PA
transitions). More precisely, we will use probabilistic ω-regular properties (which subsume, for example, probabilistic LTL)
and expected total reward properties. For the former, we will make particular use of the subclass of probabilistic safety
properties. The latter, as mentioned earlier, also allows a variety of other reward-based properties to be encoded, including
the expected reward to reach a target and time-bounded reward measures; see below for details.
In this section, we introduce the required properties; in the following section, we outline the corresponding techniques to
perform model checking. Throughout, we will assume a ﬁxed PA M= (S, s,αM, δM, L). We begin by deﬁning probabilistic
predicates and reward predicates.
Deﬁnition 8 (Probabilistic predicate). A probabilistic predicate [φ]∼p comprises an ω-regular property3 φ ⊆ (αφ)ω over some
alphabet αφ ⊆ αM , a relational operator ∼ ∈ {<,,>,} and a rational probability bound p. The probability of satisfying φ
under adversary σ is:
PrσM(φ) = PrσM
({
π ∈ IPathsM
∣∣ tr(π)αφ ∈ φ})
and satisfaction of [φ]∼p by M under adversary σ , denoted M, σ | [φ]∼p , is deﬁned as follows:
M,σ | [φ]∼p ⇔ PrσM(φ) ∼ p.
We say that M satisﬁes [φ]∼p , denoted M | [φ]∼p , if it does so under all adversaries:
M | [φ]∼p ⇔ ∀σ ∈ AdvM .M,σ | [φ]∼p .
Deﬁnition 9 (Reward predicate). A reward predicate [ρ]∼r comprises a reward structure ρ : αρ → R>0 over some alphabet
αρ ⊆ αM , a relational operator ∼ ∈ {<,,>,} and a rational reward bound r. The expected total reward for ρ under
adversary σ is:
ExpTotσM(ρ) =
∫
π∈IPathsM
ρ(π)dPrσM(π),
3 We use the term ω-regular property as a synonym for ω-regular language [27].
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M,σ | [ρ]∼r ⇔ ExpTotσM(ρ) ∼ r
and satisfaction of [ρ]∼r by M is deﬁned as:
M | [ρ]∼r ⇔ ∀σ ∈ AdvM .M,σ | [ρ]∼r .
It is worth noting that expected total reward properties (i.e. reward predicates) can also be used to specify the expected
total reward accumulated until some set T of target states is reached, which is another commonly used class of properties.
This is done by modifying the PA M to ensure that no rewards are accumulated after a state in T is reached for the ﬁrst
time. In the worst case, this requires adding a second copy of each state in the PA. Properties of this kind can, in turn, be
used to encode other useful classes of properties, such as the expected amount of reward accumulated over a ﬁxed time
period (see [28] for details).
Probabilistic predicates and reward predicates will be collectively referred to as quantitative predicates. We typically use
[φ]∼p and [ρ]∼r to denote probabilistic and reward predicates, respectively, and [ψ]∼x for an arbitrary quantitative predi-
cate.
In this work, we will often use a particular class of probabilistic predicates called probabilistic safety properties, deﬁned in
terms of regular safety properties.
Deﬁnition 10 (Regular safety property). A regular safety property φ ⊆ (αφ)ω for PA M is a set of inﬁnite words over alphabet
αφ ⊆ αM that is characterised by a regular language φ of bad preﬁxes. These are ﬁnite words, any extension of which is not
in φ, i.e.:
φ = {w ∈ (αφ)ω ∣∣ no preﬁx of w is in φ}.
We represent φ by its error automaton Aerrφ , a (complete) deterministic ﬁnite automaton (DFA) (Q ,q,αφ, δφ, F ), compris-
ing states Q , initial state q ∈ Q , alphabet αφ , transition function δφ : Q × αφ → Q and accepting states F ⊆ Q , whose
corresponding language equals φ.
Deﬁnition 11 (Probabilistic safety property). A probabilistic safety property [φ]p is a probabilistic predicate comprising a
regular safety property φ and a rational (lower) probability bound p. The probability of φ and satisfaction of [φ]p by M,
under adversary σ , are deﬁned as for probabilistic predicates above (see Deﬁnition 8).
Regular safety properties, by their deﬁnition, are a strict subclass of ω-regular properties and thus probabilistic safety
properties are a special case of the probabilistic predicates introduced in Deﬁnition 8. Probabilistic safety properties can be
used to represent a wide range of useful properties of probabilistic automata. Examples include:
• “the probability of an error occurring is at most 0.01”,
• “event A occurs before event B with probability at least 0.98”,
• “the probability of terminating within k time-units is at least 0.75”.
The last of these represents an important class of properties for timed probabilistic systems, perhaps not typically considered
as safety properties. Using the digital clocks approach of [29], verifying real-time probabilistic systems can often be reduced
to analysis of a PA with time steps encoded as a special action type. Such requirements are then naturally encoded as
probabilistic safety properties.
Example 2. Consider the two PAs Ms and Md from Example 1 (see Fig. 1) and their parallel composition Ms ‖Md , shown
in Fig. 2(a). We deﬁne a simple regular safety property φG for Ms ‖Md with the meaning “action fail never occurs”. This is
represented by the DFA AerrφG , over alphabet {fail}, shown in Fig. 2(b). The accepting state of the DFA is shaded grey. In this
simple example, Ms ‖Md has just a single adversary, under which the probability of satisfying φG is 1 − 0.2 · 0.1 = 0.98.
Thus, we have that Ms ‖Md | [φG ]0.98.
3.2. Model checking for PAs
As illustrated in the previous section, we typically verify properties of PA M by quantifying over all possible adversaries
of M. For example, for a quantitative predicate [ψ]∼x , we have:
M | [ψ]∼x ⇔ ∀σ ∈ AdvM .M,σ | [ψ]∼x.
A model checking procedure for verifying whether M satisﬁes a probabilistic predicate [φ]∼p reduces to the computation
of the minimum or maximum probability of satisfying φ:
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def= inf
σ∈AdvM
PrσM(φ) and Pr
max
M (φ)
def= sup
σ∈AdvM
PrσM(φ).
In particular, if ∼ ∈ {,>}, then M | [φ]∼p if and only if PrminM (φ) ∼ p, while if ∼ ∈ {<,}, then M | [φ]∼p if and only if
PrmaxM (φ) ∼ p. Similarly, for a reward predicate [ρ]∼r , minimum or maximum expected total rewards are required:
ExpTotminM (ρ)
def= inf
σ∈AdvM
ExpTotσM(ρ) and ExpTot
max
M (ρ)
def= sup
σ∈AdvM
ExpTotσM(ρ).
In the remainder of this section, we discuss how these values can be computed. For the probabilistic case, the problem
reduces to the calculation of reachability probabilities. For an atomic proposition q from the set AP used to label states of
PA M, we deﬁne the probability of reaching a q-labelled state under adversary σ , denoted PrσM(q), as:
PrσM(q) def= PrσM({π ∈ IPathsM ∣∣ q ∈ L(π(i)) for some i  0})
and, as for other probabilistic properties, we deﬁne:
PrminM (q) def= inf
σ∈AdvM
PrσM(q) and PrmaxM (q) def= sup
σ∈AdvM
PrσM(q).
Computation of the values PrminM (q) or PrmaxM (q) for M can be achieved by solving a linear programming problem of
size |M| [30,1], and thus performed in time polynomial in |M|. In practice, other techniques, such as value iteration or
policy iteration, are often used [31].
The probabilities PrminM (φ) or Pr
max
M (φ) for an ω-regular property φ can be computed by reducing the problem to calcu-
lating reachability probabilities in a product PA composed from the PA M and an ω-automaton for the property φ. In the
implementation developed for this work, we follow the approach of [3], which is based on the use of deterministic Rabin
automata and then determining the maximum probability of reaching a set of accepting end components. The presentation
in [3] uses ω-regular properties over atomic propositions (on states) rather than the action labels (on transitions) used here,
but the procedure is essentially the same. Full details for the action-based case can be found in [28]. The total time com-
plexity for computing probabilities is polynomial in the sizes of both the PA M and the deterministic ω-automaton for φ.
We now describe in more detail the computation of probabilities for regular safety properties, since these are used in
various places throughout the paper. Although a regular safety property φ is an instance of an ω-regular property, it is more
eﬃcient to bypass the use of ω-automata and end component identiﬁcation, instead computing reachability probabilities
directly from the product of the PA M and the error automaton for φ.
Deﬁnition 12 (PA-DFA product). Let M = (S, s,αM, δM, L) be a PA and AerrφA = (Q ,q,αA, δA, F ) be the DFA for a regular
safety property φA with αA ⊆ αM . The product of M and AerrφA is given by the PA M⊗AerrφA = (S × Q , (s,q),αM, δ′, L′),
where δ′ is deﬁned such that we have (s,q) a−→ μ × ηq′ if and only if one of the following holds:
• s a−→ μ, q′ = δA(q,a) and a ∈ αA ;
• s a−→ μ, q′ = q and a /∈ αA ;
and L′((s,q)) = L(s) ∪ {errA} if q ∈ F and L′((s,q)) = L(s) otherwise.
Intuitively, the product M⊗AerrφA records both the state of the PA M and the state of the DFA AerrφA , based on the actions
seen so far in the history of M. States of the product that correspond to accepting states of the DFA are labelled with
atomic proposition errA . The key property of a PA-DFA product is the following.
Lemma 1. For a PA M and DFA AerrφA , there is a bijection fM,A between the adversaries of M and the adversaries of the product
M ⊗ AerrφA . Moreover, for any adversary σ of M, we have the following correspondence between the probability of satisfying the
regular safety property φA and the probability of reaching an errA-labelled state in the productM⊗AerrφA :
PrσM(φA) = 1− Pr fM,A(σ )M⊗AerrφA ( errA).
Proof. The existence of bijection fM,A follows directly from the deﬁnition of the PA-DFA product M⊗AerrφA (which relies
on the fact that the automaton AerrφA is both deterministic and complete). The remainder of the lemma then follows from
Theorem 10.51 of [32]. 
Using Lemma 1, the (minimum) probability of satisfying regular safety property φA relates to (maximum) reachability
probabilities in the product as follows:
PrminM (φA) = 1− PrmaxM⊗Aerr ( errA)φA
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and therefore:
M | [φA]pA ⇔ PrmaxM⊗AerrφA ( errA) 1− pA
which means that satisfaction of a probabilistic safety property [φA]pA can be checked in time polynomial in the size of
M⊗AerrφA .
Example 3. We return to the PA Ms from Example 1 (see Fig. 1(a)) and consider a probabilistic safety property [φA]0.8
where φA is a regular safety property over alphabet αA = {warn, shutdown} with the meaning “warn occurs before
shutdown”. The error automaton AerrφA for φA is shown in Fig. 3(a). To verify [φA]0.8 against Ms , we construct the product
PA Ms ⊗AerrφA , shown in Fig. 3(b). States labelled with atomic proposition errA , i.e. those corresponding to the accepting
state a2 of the DFA are marked with grey shading. We have PrminMs (φA) = 1 − PrmaxMs⊗AerrφA ( errA) = 1 − 0.2 = 0.8, and thusMs | [φA]0.8.
Finally, we mention the computation required for expected total reward properties, i.e. to calculate ExpTotminM (ρ) or
ExpTotmaxM (ρ) for a reward structure ρ . In fact, for this, we can use very similar techniques to those for reachability proba-
bilities, such as value iteration or linear programming. We refer the reader to, for example, [3] for details.
3.3. Multi-objective model checking for PAs
In addition to conventional quantitative veriﬁcation techniques for probabilistic automata, the approach presented in
this paper requires the use of multi-objective model checking [14,15]. The conventional approach, described in the previous
section, allows us to check whether a single quantitative (probabilistic or reward) predicate holds for all adversaries of a PA
(or, dually, for at least one adversary). Multi-objective queries allow us to reason about whether adversaries satisfy multiple
properties of this form.
Deﬁnition 13 (Qmo-property). A quantitativemulti-objective property (qmo-property) for PA M is a ﬁnite conjunction4 of quan-
titative predicates ΨP = [ψ1]∼1x1 ∧ · · · ∧ [ψk]∼kxk , where each [ψi]∼i xi is a quantitative predicate for M, i.e. a probabilistic
predicate [φi]∼i pi or a reward predicate [ρi]∼i ri . We use αP to denote the set of all actions in ΨP , i.e., αψ1 ∪ · · · ∪ αψk .
We say that M satisﬁes ΨP under adversary σ , denoted M, σ | ΨP , if M, σ | [ψi]∼i xi for all 1 i  k.
We ﬁrst observe that verifying whether a qmo-property ΨP = [ψ1]∼1x1 ∧ · · · ∧ [ψk]∼kxk is satisﬁed for all adversaries of a
PA, denoted M | ΨP , reduces simply to k separate checks:
M | ΨP ⇔ ∀σ ∈ AdvM .
(∧k
i=1M,σ | [ψi]∼i xi
)
⇔ ∧ki=1M | [ψi]∼i xi .
However, a typical multi-objective query (often called an achievability query) asks if there exists an adversary of M satisfying
all k predicates, i.e. whether:
∃σ ∈ AdvM .
(∧k
i=1M,σ | [ψi]∼i xi
)
.
4 Quantitative multi-objective properties are introduced in [15], where a more general form is proposed: arbitrary Boolean combinations of predicates,
rather than just conjunctions.
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tence of such an adversary is given in [14]. This is based on a reduction to a linear programming (LP) problem, yielding
a time complexity polynomial in the sizes of the PA M and the ω-automata representing the k ω-regular properties ψi .
Whenever such an adversary exists, the solution of the LP problem yields a randomised, ﬁnite-memory adversary σ of M
satisfying all k predicates. In [15], this LP-based approach to multi-objective model checking is extended to include expected
total reward properties, i.e. for the class of qmo-properties described in Deﬁnition 13. In [33], an alternative approach to
model checking qmo-properties is presented, based on value iteration. This has higher time complexity (exponential in the
size of the model, in the worst case) but tends to perform better in practice.
Another useful class of multi-objective properties, also treated in [15,33], is that of numerical queries. These yield the
minimum or maximum achievable value for the probability of an ω-regular property φ or the expected total value of a
reward structure ρ , whilst still satisfying some qmo-property ΨP . For example, in the maximum case:
PrmaxM (φ  ΨP )
def= sup{PrσM(φ) ∣∣ σ ∈ AdvM ∧M,σ | ΨP},
ExpTotmaxM (ρ  ΨP )
def= sup{ExpTotσM(ρ) ∣∣ σ ∈ AdvM ∧M,σ | ΨP }.
The techniques for numerical queries in [33] are further extended to the class of Pareto queries, which can be used for
a more detailed analysis of the trade-off between two or more properties. For example, given two ω-regular properties
φ1 and φ2, we can consider the Pareto curve of points (p1, p2) such that [φ1]p1 ∧ [φ2]p2 is achievable but any increase
in either p1 or p2 would necessitate a decrease in the other. We discuss the use of numerical and Pareto queries for
compositional veriﬁcation in Section 6.
3.4. Model checking PAs under partial adversaries
In this section, we explain how to perform model checking of PAs over the class of partial (rather than complete)
adversaries, which will be needed later in the paper. We cover two cases. Firstly, we show that, for model checking of
probabilistic safety properties, these two classes of adversaries are equivalent. Secondly, we show any other kind of property
can be handled using a simple transformation of the PA. In both cases, we then have a reduction from model checking of
PAs over partial adversaries to the problem of model checking over complete adversaries, as described in the preceding
sections.
The following proposition states that satisfaction of probabilistic safety properties is equivalent whether quantifying over
complete adversaries or over the larger class of partial adversaries. This is because checking probabilistic safety properties
reduces to the computation of maximum reachability probabilities.
Proposition 1. For any PAM and probabilistic safety property [φA]p , we have:
M | [φA]p ⇔ ∀σ ∈ AdvpartM .M,σ | [φA]p.
Proof. Consider any PA M and probabilistic safety property [φA]pA . By Deﬁnition 8, we have:
M | [φA]p ⇔ ∀σ ∈ AdvM .M,σ | [φA]p
and from Lemma 1 there is a bijection fM,A between the adversaries of PA M and the PA-DFA product M⊗AerrφA .
For the ⇒ direction, we assume M | [φA]p and consider any partial adversary σ of M. Now, letting σ ′ be a com-
pletion of σ , it follows that fM,A(σ ′) is a completion of fM,A(σ ) and, by the deﬁnition of reachability probabilities, we
have:
Pr
fM,A
(
σ ′
)
M⊗AerrφA
( errA) Pr fM,A(σ )M⊗AerrφA ( errA). (1)
Next, using Lemma 1, we have:
PrσM(φA) = 1− Pr fM,A(σ )M⊗AerrφA ( errA)
 1− Pr fM,A
(
σ ′
)
M⊗AerrφA
( errA) by (1)
= Prσ ′M(φA) by Lemma 1
 p since M | [φA]p.
Therefore, since σ was an arbitrary partial adversary of M, this half of the proof is complete.
For the ⇐ direction, the result follows directly from the fact that AdvM ⊂ Advpart. M
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satisfaction under complete adversaries after performing a simple transformation of M which adds a probability 1 self-loop
to every state. We formalise this transformation as a special case of alphabet extension (see Deﬁnition 7) using a fresh
action b. The transformed PA is thus denoted M[{b}].
Proposition 2. For any PAM, action b /∈ αM and qmo-property ΨP , we have:
∃σ ∈ AdvpartM .M,σ | ΨP ⇔ ∃σ ′ ∈ AdvM[{b}] .M[{b}],σ ′ | ΨP .
Proof. Consider any PA M= (S, s,αM, δM, L) and action b /∈ αM . By Deﬁnition 7 the only difference between the PAs M
and M[{b}] is that the probabilistic transition relation of M[{b}] extends the one of M with a ‘self-loop’ transition for
each state, labelled with the action b.
For the direction ⇒, the proof follows by showing that, for any partial adversary σ of M, we can construct a complete
adversary σ ′ of M[{b}] which satisﬁes precisely the same qmo-properties that do not include b in their alphabet. The
construction proceeds as follows. For any ﬁnite path π ′ ∈ FPathsM[{b}] we have the following two cases to consider.
• If π ′ ∈ FPathsM , then for any action distribution pair (a′,μ′) ∈ Dist(αM[{b}] × Dist(S)):
σ ′
(
π ′
)(
a′,μ′
)=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
σ(π ′)(a′,μ′) if a ∈ αM,
1−∑(a,μ)∈Dist(αM×Dist(S)) σ (π ′)(a,μ) if (a′,μ′) = (b, ηlast(π)),
0 otherwise.
• If π ′ /∈ FPathsM , then for any action distribution pair (a′,μ′) ∈ Dist(αM[{b}] × Dist(S)):
σ ′
(
π ′
)(
a′,μ′
)=
{
1 if (a′,μ′) = (b, ηlast(σ ′)),
0 otherwise.
The fact that these adversaries satisfy the same qmo-properties (not including b in their alphabet) follows by construction
of the probability measure for σ and σ ′ .
For the direction ⇐, the proof follows by showing that, for any complete adversary σ ′ of M[{b}], we can construct a
partial adversary σ of M[{b}] which satisﬁes precisely the same qmo-properties that do not include b in their alphabet.
Before giving the construction, we need to deﬁne a mapping from paths of M[{b}] to paths of M. This mapping essentially
removes the transitions of the path labelled with the action b. This always yields feasible paths of M since all transitions
of M[{b}] labelled with the action b correspond to self-loops. Formally, for any ﬁnite path π ′ ∈ FPathsM[{b}] , let π ′αM be
the ﬁnite path of FPathsM where:
π ′αM =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
π ′′αM
(a,μ)−−−→ s if π ′ is of the form π ′′ (a,μ)−−−→ s and a = b,
π ′′αM if π ′ is of the form π ′′
(b,ηs)−−−→ s,
π ′ otherwise.
From Deﬁnition 7, in the ‘otherwise’ case above, it follows that π ′ is a path of length 0, that is, a state of M.
Now, considering any complete adversary σ ′ of M[{b}], we construct the following partial adversary σ of M. For any
ﬁnite path π ∈ FPathsM and action distribution pair (a,μ) ∈ Dist(αM × Dist(S)):
σ(π)(a,μ) =
∑{|Prσ ′M[{b}](π ′) · σ ′(π ′)(a,μ) | π ′ ∈ FPathsM[{b}] ∧ π ′αM = π |}
PrσM(π)
.
The remainder of the proof follows from the construction of the probability measures for the adversaries σ ′ and σ . 
3.5. Model checking PAs under fairness
We conclude our discussion of model checking techniques for PAs with the topic of fairness. When verifying systems
where multiple PAs are composed in parallel and can execute asynchronously, it is often necessary to impose conditions
that ensure the PAs are scheduled in a fair manner. These fairness conditions, which typically correspond to reasonable
assumptions about the system being modelled, may be essential in order to verify even trivial properties.
In this paper, we use a simple but effective notion of fairness called unconditional fairness, in which it is required that
each component makes a transition inﬁnitely often. For probabilistic automata, a natural approach to incorporating fairness
(as taken in, e.g., [34,35]) is to restrict analysis of the system to a class of adversaries in which fair behaviour occurs with
probability 1.
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π ∈ IPathsM in which, for each component Mi , there exists an action a ∈ αMi that appears inﬁnitely often. A fair adversary
σ of M is an adversary for which PrσM{π ∈ IPathsM | π is fair} = 1. We let AdvfairM denote the set of fair adversaries of M.
An important consequence of our deﬁnition of fairness is that the projection of a fair adversary onto its component PAs
results in a complete, rather than partial, adversaries.
Lemma 2. IfM1,M2 are PAs and σ ∈ AdvfairM1‖M2 , then σ Mi is a complete adversary for i = 1,2.
Proof. Consider any PAs M1 and M2 and adversary σ ∈ AdvfairM1‖M2 . Suppose for a contradiction that σ Mi is a partial
adversary for some i = 1,2. Since σ Mi is partial, by deﬁnition there exists some ﬁnite path πﬁni of Mi such that:∑
(last(πﬁni ),a,μi)∈δMi
σ Mi
(
π
ﬁn
i
)
(a,μi) < 1.
Now, by Deﬁnition 6, it follows that:
1−
∑
(last(πﬁni ),a,μi)∈δMi
σ Mi
(
π
ﬁn
i
)
(a,μi) = PrσM1‖M2
({
π ∈ IPathsσM1‖M2
∣∣ πMi = πﬁni }).
By the deﬁnition of a fair path, we have that the projection of a fair path is always inﬁnite and, combining this fact with
the above, yields:
PrσM1‖M2
({
π ∈ IPathsσM
∣∣ π is not fair}) PrσM1‖M2({π ∈ IPathsσM1‖M2 ∣∣ πMi = πﬁni })> 0
which contradicts the fact that σ is a fair adversary as required. 
Veriﬁcation of a quantitative predicate [ψ]∼x against a multi-component PA M=M1‖ · · · ‖Mn under fairness is deﬁned
by quantifying only over fair adversaries:
M |fair [ψ]∼x ⇔ ∀σ ∈ AdvfairM .M,σ | [ψ]∼x.
Model checking algorithms for verifying PAs under fairness are presented in [35]. These techniques apply to more general
notions of strong and weak fairness, of which unconditional fairness is a special case. The algorithms work by restricting
the set of end components of the PA under consideration. A related problem is realisability: determining whether a PA has
any (unconditionally) fair adversaries. Eﬃcient techniques for this problem, based on an analysis of the underlying graph of
a PA, can be found in [36].
We can also pose multi-objective queries, as discussed in the previous section, in the context of fairness, i.e., ask whether
there exists a fair adversary satisfying all conjuncts of a qmo-property ΨP = [ψ1]∼1x1 ∧ · · · ∧ [ψk]∼kxk :
∃σ ∈ AdvfairM .
(∧k
i=1M,σ | [ψi]∼i xi
)
.
This can be reduced to a normal multi-objective query, i.e. over all adversaries. Our deﬁnition of a fair adversary can be
captured by a single ω-regular probabilistic predicate [φfair]1, where:
φfair =
n⋂
i=1
{
w ∈ (αM)ω
∣∣ some action a ∈ αMi appears in w inﬁnitely often}.
Thus, we can check for a fair adversary satisfying ΨP by checking for an arbitrary adversary that satisﬁes ΨP ∧ [φfair]1.
4. Assume-guarantee veriﬁcation for probabilistic automata
We now present our compositional veriﬁcation framework for probabilistic automata. The approach is based on the
well-known assume-guarantee paradigm and builds on the multi-objective model checking techniques summarised in Sec-
tion 3.3. In this section, we deﬁne the basic underlying ideas and then introduce our two main classes of assume-guarantee
proof rules, for safety properties and general quantitative properties. In Section 5, we will consider a number of further
assume-guarantee proof rules.
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The key ingredient of classical assume-guarantee reasoning is the assume-guarantee triple, comprising a component, an
assumption and a guarantee. To enable compositional veriﬁcation of probabilistic systems, we introduce probabilistic assume-
guarantee triples. These triples take the form 〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG〉, where M is a PA, representing a component of a probabilistic
system, and ΨA and ΨG are qmo-properties, representing an assumption and a guarantee, respectively. Triples are also
parameterised by a class of adversaries for M, denoted by the symbol  ∈ {part, comp, fair}, indicating the set of partial,
complete or fair adversaries, respectively. The triple 〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG 〉 asserts that any adversary for M (of type ) which
satisﬁes the assumption ΨA also satisﬁes the guarantee ΨG . Formally, we have the following deﬁnition.5
Deﬁnition 14 (Probabilistic assume-guarantee triple). Let M be a PA, ΨA and ΨG be qmo-properties such that αG ⊆ αA ∪αM
and  ∈ {part, comp, fair} be a class of adversaries. Then 〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG 〉 is a probabilistic assume-guarantee triple with the
following semantics:
〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG〉 ⇔ ∀σ ∈ AdvM[αA ] .
(M[αA],σ | ΨA →M[αA],σ | ΨG).
Notice that Deﬁnition 14 quantiﬁes over adversaries of the alphabet extension M[αA] of M (see Deﬁnition 7), rather
than M itself. This is because, when we come to use these triples to formulate assume-guarantee proof rules, ΨG will be
a property of the overall system being veriﬁed, of which M is just one component. Property ΨG may therefore be deﬁned
over a superset of the actions in the alphabet αM of M and, as a result, the assumption ΨA may also include additional
actions not in αM .
Because probabilistic assume-guarantee triples are stated in terms of quantiﬁcation over adversaries, checking whether
or not a triple is true can be reduced to a multi-objective model checking problem of the form described in the previous
section. More precisely, we ascertain whether 〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG 〉 is not true by checking for the existence of an adversary that
satisﬁes the assumption ΨA but does not satisfy the property ΨG .
Proposition 3. Let PA M, qmo-properties ΨA,ΨG and  ∈ {part, comp, fair} be as given in Deﬁnition 14. Furthermore, let ΨG be
of the form [ψG ]∼xG , i.e., a single quantitative predicate.6 Then, checking whether the assume-guarantee triple 〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG 〉 holds
reduces to multi-objective model checking as follows:
〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG〉 ⇔ ¬∃σ ∈ AdvM[αA ] .
(M[αA],σ | ΨA ∧M[αA],σ | [ψG ]∼xG ).
This can be done using the techniques from [15], described in Section 3.3, with time complexity polynomial in the sizes of the PA M
and the (deterministic Rabin) automata representing the probabilistic predicates that occur in ΨA and ΨG .
Proof. The result follows directly from Deﬁnition 14. 
Moreover, for the special case of assume guarantee triples restricted to probabilistic safety properties and partial adver-
saries, checking whether the triple holds reduces to the simpler multi-objective model checking algorithm of [14].
Proposition 4. LetM be a PA,Ψ safeA = [φ1]p1 ∧· · ·∧[φn]pn be a conjunction of probabilistic safety properties andΨ safeG = [φG ]pG
be a single probabilistic safety property. IfM′ is the product PAM[αA] ⊗Aerrφ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Aerrφn ⊗AerrφG , then:〈
Ψ
safe
A
〉Mpart〈Ψ safeG 〉 ⇔ ¬∃σ ′∈AdvpartM′ . ((∧ni=1Prσ ′M′(erri) 1− pi)∧ Prσ ′M′(errG) > 1− pG).
This can be checked in time polynomial in the sizes ofM,Aerrφ1 , . . . ,Aerrφn andAerrφG .
Proof. Consider any PA M, conjunction of probabilistic safety properties Ψ safeA = [φ1]p1 ∧ · · · ∧ [φn]pn and single prob-
abilistic safety property Ψ safeG = [φG ]pG . Letting M′ be the product M[αA] ⊗Aerrφ1 ⊗ · · · ⊗Aerrφn ⊗AerrφG , through repeated
application of Lemma 1, we can construct a bijective function f : AdvpartM[αA ] → Adv
part
M′ such that, for any (partial) adversary
σ of M[αA] and φi ∈ {φ1, . . . , φn, φG}:
PrσM[αA ](φi) = 1− Pr f (σ )M′ (erri). (2)
Now, using Deﬁnition 14, we have:
5 Our deﬁnition of assume-guarantee triple generalises the one we originally presented in [17], where the parameter  is omitted. In that work, the set
of partial adversaries is always used, i.e.  = part.
6 For clarity of presentation, we restrict our attention in Proposition 3 to the case where ΨG is a single predicate and then later generalise to arbitrary
triples in Theorem 3.
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Ψ
safe
A
〉Mpart〈Ψ safeG 〉
⇔ ∀σ∈AdvpartM[αA ].
((∧n
i=1PrσM[αA ](φi)pi
)
→ PrσM[αA ](φG)pG
)
⇔ ∀σ∈AdvpartM[αA ].
((∧n
i=1Pr
f (σ )
M′ (erri)1− pi
)
→ Pr f (σ )M′ (errG)1− pG
)
using (2)
⇔ ∀σ ′∈AdvpartM′ .
((∧n
i=1Prσ
′
M′(erri)1− pi
)
→ Prσ ′M′(errG)1− pG
)
since f is a bijection
⇔ ¬∃σ ′∈AdvpartM′ .
((∧n
i=1Prσ
′
M′(erri)1− pi
)
∧ Prσ ′M′(errG)>1− pG
)
rearranging
which completes the proof. 
4.2. Assume-guarantee veriﬁcation for safety properties
We now present, using the deﬁnitions above, asymmetric assume-guarantee proof rules for compositional veriﬁcation
of probabilistic automata, that is, those which use only a single assumption about one system component. Experience in
the non-probabilistic setting [7] indicates that, despite their simplicity, rules of this form are widely applicable. First, in
this section, we discuss an approach in which both assumptions and guarantees are probabilistic safety properties. Then, in
Section 4.3, we describe how to handle a wider class of quantitative properties, including ω-regular and reward properties,
by incorporating fairness. To simplify the presentation, here and in Section 4.3 we restrict our attention to guarantees
consisting of a single predicate, however in Section 4.4 we extend the approach to allow general guarantees.
Our ﬁrst proof rule, (Asym-Safety), can be stated as follows.7
Theorem 1. If M1,M2 are PAs, Ψ safeA is a conjunction of probabilistic safety properties and Ψ safeG is a single probabilistic safety
property such that αA ⊆ αM1 and αG ⊆ αM2 ∪ αA , then the following proof rule holds:
M1 | Ψ safeA
〈Ψ safeA 〉M2part〈Ψ safeG 〉
M1 ‖M2 | Ψ safeG
(Asym-Safety).
Theorem 1 means that, given an appropriate assumption Ψ safeA = [φ1]p1 ∧ · · · ∧ [φn]pn , we can check the correctness of
a probabilistic safety property [φG ]pG on a two-component system, M1 ‖M2, without constructing and model checking
the full system. Instead, we perform one instance of (standard) model checking on M1, to check the ﬁrst premise of rule
(Asym-Safety), and one instance of multi-objective model checking on M2[αA], to check the assume-guarantee triple in the
second premise (recall, from Deﬁnition 14, that a triple for M2 is deﬁned in terms of M2[αA]). If the error automata Aerrφi
for the regular safety properties φi in the assumption are much smaller than the PA for component M1, we can expect
signiﬁcant gains in terms of the overall performance for veriﬁcation. Our experimental results, described later in Section 7,
show that this can indeed be the case in practice.
Before proving Theorem 1, we give an example of its usage.
Example 4. We illustrate the application of rule (Asym-Safety) using the PAs Ms and Md from Example 1 (see Fig. 1) and
property Ψ safeG = [φG ]0.98 from Example 2, letting M1 =Ms and M2 =Md . As an assumption, we use the probabilistic
safety property Ψ safeA = [φA]0.8 from Example 3, where φA means “warn occurs before shutdown”.
Checking the ﬁrst premise of (Asym-Safety) amounts to verifying that Ms | [φA]0.8, which was illustrated previously
in Example 3. To complete the veriﬁcation, we need to check the second premise, i.e. 〈Ψ safeA 〉Mdpart〈Ψ safeG 〉, which reduces
to a multi-objective model checking problem on Md (notice that αA = {warn, shutdown} ⊆ αMd so Md[αA] =Md). More
precisely, from Proposition 4, we need to check that, for the product PA Md ⊗AerrφA ⊗ AerrφG , there is no adversary under
which the probability of reaching errA states is at most 1− 0.8 = 0.2 and the probability of reaching an errG state is strictly
above 1− 0.98 = 0.02.
The product is shown in Fig. 4, where we indicate states satisfying errA and errG by shading in grey the accepting
states a2 and q1 of the corresponding DFAs AerrφA and AerrφG . By inspection, we see that no such adversary exists, so we
can deduce that Ms‖Md | [φG ]0.98. Consider, however, the adversary σ which, in the initial state, chooses warn with
probability 0.8 and shutdown with probability 0.2. This reaches errA with probability 0.2 and errG with probability 0.02. So,
〈Ψ safeA 〉Mdpart〈Ψ safeG 〉 does not hold for any value of pG > 1− 0.02= 0.98.
7 This rule is equivalent to the rule (Asym) we originally presented in [17]. In that work, the ﬁrst premise and conclusion quantify over partial adversaries,
rather than all adversaries. However, as Proposition 1 shows, these are equivalent.
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We now prove Theorem 1. For this, and for the other results in this section, we require the following lemma, adapted
from [8].
Lemma 3. Let M1,M2 be PAs, σ an adversary (complete or partial) of M1 ‖ M2 , α ⊆ αM1‖M2 and i = 1,2. If φi and φ′i are
ω-regular properties over αi and α′i such that αi ⊆ αMi and α′i ⊆ αMi [α] , then:
(a) PrσM1‖M2(φi) = Pr
σMi
Mi (φi),
(b) PrσM1‖M2
(
φ′i
)= PrσMi [α]Mi [α] (φ′i).
If ρ and ρ ′i are reward structures over αi and α
′
i , then:
(c) ExpTotσM1‖M2(ρi) = ExpTot
σMi
Mi (ρi),
(d) ExpTotσM1‖M2
(
ρ ′i
)= ExpTotσMi [α]Mi [α] (ρ ′i ).
If Ψi and Ψ ′i are qmo-properties over αi and α
′
i , then:
(e) M1 ‖M2,σ | Ψi ⇔ Mi,σ Mi | Ψi,
(f) M1 ‖M2,σ | Ψ ′i ⇔ Mi[α],σ Mi [α] |Ψ ′i .
Note that the projections onto Mi[α] in the above are well deﬁned since the condition α ⊆ αM1‖M2 implies that M1 ‖ M2 =
M1[α]‖M2 =M1 ‖M2[α].
Proof. Parts (a)–(d) are a simple extension of [8, Lemma 7.2.6, page 141]. Parts (e) and (f) follow directly from parts
(a)–(d). 
Lemma 3 is fundamental to the proof rules that we present in this paper. It relates an adversary σ of a composed PA
M1 ‖ M2 and the adversary σ Mi that results when projecting σ onto one of the component PAs Mi . In essence, it
says that, if a property (e.g. an ω-regular property φi) refers only to actions that appear in Mi (i.e., αi ⊆ αMi ), then the
probability of that property is the same in M1 ‖M2 under σ , and in Mi under σ Mi .
Proof (of Theorem 1). Let M1 and M2 be PAs, Ψ safeA a conjunction of probabilistic safety properties and Ψ safeG is a single
probabilistic safety property such that αA ⊆ αM1 , αG ⊆ αM2 ∪ αA , M1 | Ψ safeA and 〈Ψ safeA 〉M2part〈Ψ safeG 〉. For any adver-
sary σ of M1 ‖ M2 by deﬁnition we have M1, σ | Ψ safeA , and hence since σ M1 is a partial adversary of M1, using
Proposition 1 we have:
M1 | Ψ safeA ⇒ M1,σ M1 |Ψ safeA
⇒ M1 ‖M2,σ | Ψ safeA by Lemma 3(e) since αA ⊆ αM1
⇒ M2[αA],σ M2[αA ] |Ψ safeA by Lemma 3(f) since αA ⊆ αM2[αA ]
⇒ M2[αA],σ M2[αA ] |Ψ safeG since
〈
Ψ
safe
A
〉M2part〈Ψ safeG 〉
⇒ M1 ‖M2,σ | Ψ safeG by Lemma 3(f) since αG ⊆ αM2[αA ].
Since σ was an arbitrary adversary of M1 ‖M2, it follows that M1 ‖M2 |Ψ safeG , as required. 
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4.3. Assume-guarantee veriﬁcation for quantitative properties
Next, we extend our assume-guarantee framework with a proof rule in which the properties to be proved and the
assumptions used to do so can comprise arbitrary quantitative predicates, rather than just probabilistic safety properties.
More precisely, we use a qmo-property ΨA for an assumption and a single quantitative predicate ΨG = [ψG ]∼G xG for the
property to be proved. Recall that quantitative predicates include probabilistic ω-regular properties (which subsume both
probabilistic safety properties and probabilistic LTL) and expected total reward properties.
To make this possible, we need an additional ingredient: fairness. Our proof rule provides compositional veriﬁcation of a
multi-component system M1 ‖M2 under (unconditional) fairness, i.e. it guarantees that ΨG holds under any fair adversary
of M1‖M2. The reason that fairness enables this rule to work stems from the fact that the projection of a fair adversary
of M1 ‖M2 onto a component Mi is a complete adversary, as will become clear when we prove the rule subsequently.
As in the previous section, we initially restrict our attention to an asymmetric assume-guarantee proof rule. Formally,
we state this as follows.
Theorem 2. LetM1,M2 be PAs, ΨA a qmo-property and ΨG = [ψG ]∼G xG a single quantitative predicate, such that αA ⊆ αM1 and
αG ⊆ αA ∪ αM2 . Then the following proof rule holds:
M1 |fair ΨA
〈ΨA〉M2fair〈ΨG〉
M1 ‖M2 |fair ΨG
(Asym-Quant ).
Theorem 2 provides the means to verify an ω-regular or reward property ΨG on a composed system M1 ‖ M2. Like
(Asym-Safety) in Theorem 1, we can do this without constructing M1 ‖M2 by decomposing into two-sub problems: one
instance of normal veriﬁcation (premise 1) and one instance of multi-objective model checking (premise 2). Again, these
two steps have the potential to be signiﬁcantly cheaper than verifying the combined system M1 ‖M2.
The inclusion of fairness in the two premises of (Asym-Quant) is to permit recursive applications of the rule, in order to
compositionally verify systems comprising more than two components. If M1 is just a single PA, the stronger (but easier)
check M1 | ΨA suﬃces for premise 1. Similarly, if M2 is a single PA, we can check 〈ΨA〉M2comp〈ΨG〉 for premise 2.
Example 5. We illustrate proof rule (Asym-Quant) from Theorem 2 using another pair of PAs, Mm and Mc , shown in
Fig. 5, representing a machine and its controller, respectively. The machine Mm executes 2 consecutive jobs, each in 1 of
2 ways: fast, which requires 1 second, but fails with probability 0.1; or slow, which requires 3 seconds, and never fails.
PA Mc models a speciﬁc controller for the machine, which instructs it which way to execute jobs, when composed in
parallel with Mm . With probability 0.5, the controller sends an initial instruction slow. Subsequently, it only sends the
instruction fast.
Our aim is to verify that the expected total execution time for the controlled machine is at most 196 . Since PAs do not
explicitly model time, we achieve this by using a reward structure ρtime = {fast → 1, slow → 3} to capture the passage of
time and reward predicate ΨG = [ρtime] 196 . We apply rule (Asym-Quant), with M1 = Mc and M2 = Mm . Let φon be
the ω-regular property stating that action off never occurs (i.e. ¬off in LTL notation) and ρslow = {slow→1} be a reward
structure that counts the number of occurrences of action slow. We use the assumption ΨA = [φon]1 ∧ [ρslow] 12 , i.e. we
assume the controller never issues an off instruction and that the expected number of slow jobs requested is at most 0.5.
We ﬁrst verify (separately) that Mc | [φon]1 and Mc | [ρslow] 12 , from which we conclude that Mc | ΨA . Next,
we check the assume-guarantee triple 〈ΨA〉Mmcomp〈ΨG 〉. The triple is checked by verifying that no (complete) adversary
of Mm satisﬁes [φon]1 ∧ [ρslow] 12 ∧ [ρtime]> 196 , which we see to be true from inspection. Thus, we can conclude that
Mc‖Mm |fair [ρtime] 19 . 6
54 M. Kwiatkowska et al. / Information and Computation 232 (2013) 38–65Proof (of Theorem 2). Suppose M1 and M2 are PAs, ΨA is a qmo-property and ΨG = [ψG ]∼G xG is a single quantitative
predicate, such that both M1 |fair ΨA and 〈ΨA〉M2fair〈ΨG 〉 hold. Consider an arbitrary fair adversary σ of M1 ‖M2. Now,
from Lemma 2, we know that σ M1 is a complete adversary of M1. Furthermore, we have that M1, σ M1 is also fair, and
hence by deﬁnition of |fair:
M1 |fair ΨA ⇒ M1,σ M1 | ΨA
⇒ M1 ‖M2,σ |ΨA by Lemma 3(e) since αA ⊆ αM1
⇒ M2[αA],σ M2[αA ] |ΨA by Lemma 3(f) since αA ⊆ αM2[αA ]
⇒ M2[αA],σ M2[αA ] |ΨG since 〈ΨA〉M2fair〈ΨG〉
⇒ M1 ‖M2,σ |ΨG by Lemma 3(f) since αG ⊆ αM2[αA ].
Since σ was an arbitrary fair adversary of M1 ‖M2, we have M1 ‖M2 |fair ΨG , as required. 
4.4. Extensions
Next, we discuss two ways in which the proof rules presented so far can be extended. Subsequently, in Section 5, we
will present several additional rules.
Conjunctions of predicates. Firstly, we remark that it is straightforward to extend our approach to verify properties that are
conjunctions of predicates, rather than single predicates. For presentational simplicity, we so far assumed (in Propositions 3
and 4, and Theorems 1 and 2) that the qmo-property ΨG used on the right hand side of a triple 〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG〉 comprised a
single predicate. However, checking a triple in which ΨG is a conjunction of k predicates can be decomposed into k separate
checks, i.e, k applications of Proposition 3 or Proposition 4.
Theorem 3. LetM be a PA and, for i = 1,2, let Ψ safeAi , Ψ
safe
Gi
, ΨAi and ΨGi be qmo-properties, where those marked with the superscript
“safe” comprise only probabilistic safety properties. Then the following proof rules hold:
〈Ψ safeA1 〉Mpart〈Ψ
safe
G1
〉
〈Ψ safeA2 〉Mpart〈Ψ
safe
G2
〉
〈Ψ safeA∧ 〉Mpart〈Ψ
safe
G∧ 〉
(Conj-Safety ),
〈ΨA1〉Mfair〈ΨG1〉
〈ΨA2〉Mfair〈ΨG2〉
〈ΨA∧〉Mfair〈ΨG∧〉
( Conj-Quant)
where Ψ safeA∧ = Ψ
safe
A1
∧ Ψ safeA2 , Ψ
safe
G∧ = Ψ
safe
G1
∧ Ψ safeG2 , ΨA∧ = ΨA1 ∧ ΨA2 and ΨG∧ = ΨG1 ∧ ΨG2 .
Proof. The result follows directly from the deﬁnition of assume-guarantee triples (see Deﬁnition 14). 
Theorem 3 provides a way to check assume-guarantee triples containing arbitrary qmo-properties. Furthermore, observe
that Theorems 1 and 2 can easily be generalised to the case where the property Ψ safeG or ΨG being proved on the systemM1 ‖M2 comprises more than one predicate, thus yielding proof rules for arbitrary qmo-properties.
Notice that, in Theorem 3, unlike the previous theorems, we omitted explicit statements about the restrictions imposed
on the alphabets of the PAs and properties. There, and from this point on, we will implicitly assume that, if a rule contains
an occurrence of the triple 〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG 〉, then αG ⊆ αA ∪ αM; similarly, for a premise that checks ΨA against M, we
assume that αA ⊆ αM .
Multiple components. Secondly, we observe that, simply through repeated application of either (Asym-Safety) or
(Asym-Quant), we obtain proof rules for systems consisting of n components.
Theorem 4. Let M1, . . . ,Mn be PAs and Ψ safeA1 , . . . ,Ψ
safe
An−1 , Ψ
safe
G , ΨA1 , . . . ,ΨAn−1 and ΨG be qmo-properties, where those marked
with the superscript “safe” comprise only probabilistic safety properties. Then the following proof rules hold:
M1 | Ψ safeA1
〈Ψ safeA1 〉M2part〈Ψ
safe
A2
〉
· · ·
〈Ψ safeAn−1〉Mnpart〈Ψ
safe
G 〉
M1 ‖ · · · ‖Mn | Ψ safeG
(Asym-Safety-N),
M1 |fair ΨA1
〈ΨA1〉M2fair〈ΨA2〉
· · ·
〈ΨAn−1〉Mnfair〈ΨG〉
M1 ‖ · · · ‖Mn |fair ΨG
( Asym-Quant-N).
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respectively, to the parallel composition of M1‖ · · · ‖Mi−1 and Mi , for i = 2, . . . ,n. 
Elsewhere [20], we have already successfully applied rule (Asym-Safety-N), showing that it can be signiﬁcantly more
eﬃcient to use an N-way, rather than 2-way, decomposition for assume-guarantee veriﬁcation. It also worth noting at this
point that the parallel composition operator ‖ for PAs is both associative and commutative, which allows for ﬂexibility in
the way that multi-component rules are applied, and the way that several separate proof rules are combined.
5. Further proof rules
In this section, we consider three additional classes of assume-guarantee proof rules for compositional veriﬁcation of
probabilistic automata.
5.1. Circular proof rules
One potential limitation of the various proof rules considered so far is that they are all asymmetric, i.e., they may analyse,
for example, a component M2 using an assumption ΨA about another component M1, but checking whether M1 satisﬁes
ΨA cannot make any assumptions about M2. Below, we give proof rules that we call circular, which do allow the use of
additional assumptions in this way.
Theorem 5. If M1 and M2 are PAs, Ψ safeA1 , Ψ
safe
A2
, Ψ safeG are qmo-properties comprising only safety properties and ΨA1 , ΨA2 and ΨG
are qmo-properties, then the following circular assume-guarantee proof rules hold:
M2 | Ψ safeA2
〈Ψ safeA2 〉M1part〈Ψ
safe
A1
〉
〈Ψ safeA1 〉M2part〈Ψ
safe
G 〉
M1 ‖M2 | Ψ safeG
(Circ-Safety),
M2 |fair ΨA2
〈ΨA2〉M1fair〈ΨA1〉
〈ΨA1〉M2fair〈ΨG〉
M1 ‖M2 |fair ΨG
( Circ-Quant).
Proof. We give the proof of (Circ-Quant); the proof for (Circ-Safety) follows similarly using Proposition 1 as opposed to
Lemma 2 (see the proof of Theorem 1).
Suppose M1 and M2 are PAs, ΨA1 , ΨA2 and ΨG are qmo-properties, such that M2 |fair ΨA2 , 〈ΨA2 〉M1fair〈ΨA1 〉 and
〈ΨA1 〉M2fair〈ΨG 〉 hold. Now, consider an arbitrary fair adversary σ of M1‖M2. Since M2 |fair ΨA2 , using Lemma 2, we
have M2, σ M2 | ΨA2 and therefore, since αA2 ⊆ αM2 and applying Lemma 3(e), we have:
M2,σ M2ΨA2 ⇒ M1 ‖M2,σ | ΨA2
⇒ M1[αA2 ],σ M1[αA2 ] |ΨA2 by Lemma 3(f) since αA2 ⊆ αM1[αA2 ]
⇒ M1[αA2 ],σ M1[αA2 ] |ΨA1 since 〈ΨA2〉M1fair〈ΨA1〉
⇒ M1 ‖M2,σ | ΨA1 by Lemma 3(f) since αA2 ⊆ αM2
⇒ M2[αA1 ],σ M2[αA1 ] |ΨA1 by Lemma 3(f) since αA1 ⊆ αM2[αA1 ]
⇒ M2[αA1 ],σ M2[αA1 ] | ΨG since 〈ΨA1〉M2fair〈ΨG〉
⇒ M1 ‖M2,σ | ΨG by Lemma 3(f) since αG ⊆ αM2[αA1 ].
Therefore, since σ was an arbitrary fair adversary of M1 ‖M2, we have M1 ‖M2 |fair ΨG as required. 
5.2. Asynchronous proof rules
Our next class of rules is motivated by the fact that, often, part of a system comprises several asynchronous components,
that is, components with disjoint alphabets. In such cases, it can be diﬃcult to establish useful probability bounds on
the combined system if the fact that the components act independently is ignored. For example, consider the case of n
independent coin ﬂips; in isolation, we have that the probability of each coin not returning a tail is 1/2. Ignoring the
independence of the coins, all we can say is that the probability of any of them not returning a tail is at least 1/2. However,
using their independence, we have that this probability is at least 1 − 1/2n . In the context of our assume-guarantee proof
rules, we can reason about systems with asynchronous components as follows.
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safe
Gi
= [φsafeGi ]pGi be a single
probabilistic safety property. If (αM1 ∪ αA1 ) ∩ (αM2 ∪ αA2 ) = ∅ (which implies that αM1 ∩ αM2 = ∅, i.e., the components are
asynchronous), then the following proof rule holds:
〈Ψ safeA1 〉M1part〈Ψ
safe
G1
〉
〈Ψ safeA2 〉M2part〈Ψ
safe
G2
〉
〈Ψ safeA 〉M1 ‖M2part〈Ψ safeG 〉
(Async-Safety )
where Ψ safeA = Ψ safeA1 ∧ Ψ
safe
A2
and Ψ safeG = [φsafeG1 ∪ φ
safe
G2
]pG1+pG2−pG1 ·pG2 . Note that the union of two regular safety properties is also
a regular safety property.
In addition, if ∼ ∈ {<,,,>} and, for i = 1,2, we have that ΨAi is a qmo-property and ΨGi = [φGi ]∼pGi is a single probabilistic
predicate such that (αM1 ∪ αA1 ) ∩ (αM2 ∪ αA2 ) = ∅, then the following proof rule holds:
〈ΨA1〉M1fair〈ΨG1〉
〈ΨA2〉M2fair〈ΨG2〉
〈ΨA〉M1 ‖M2fair〈ΨG〉
(Async-Quant )
where ΨA = ΨA1 ∧ ΨA2 and ΨG = [φG1 ∪ φG2 ]∼pG1+pG2−pG1 ·pG2 . Note that ω-regular properties are closed under union (and also
intersection and complementation).
Proof. We consider the case of general quantitative predicates, i.e. rule (Async-Quant). The case for safety properties follows
similarly. Therefore, suppose for i = 1,2 that Mi is a PA, ΨAi is a qmo-property and ΨGi = [φGi ]∼pGi is a single probabilistic
predicate such that (αM1 ∪ αA1 ) ∩ (αM2 ∪ αA2 ) = ∅ and 〈ΨAi 〉Mi fair〈ΨGi 〉 for i = 1,2. In addition, let ΨA = ΨA1 ∧ ΨA2 and
ΨG = [φG1 ∪ φG2 ]∼pG1+pG2−pG1 ·pG2 .
Now, to show 〈ΨA〉M1 ‖M2fair〈ΨG 〉 holds, we consider any fair adversary σ of (M1 ‖ M2)[αA] such that (M1 ‖
M2)[αA], σ | ΨA . Letting φ be the complement of an ω-regular property, it follows that:
Prσ(M1‖M2)[αA ](φG1 ∪ φG2) = 1− Prσ(M1‖M2)[αA ](φG1 ∩ φG2). (3)
Next, since αA = αA1 ∪ αA2 and the parallel composition operator is commutative and associative, using Deﬁnition 7 we
have:
(M1 ‖M2)[αA] =
(M1[αA1 ]) ‖ (M2[αA2 ]).
Using this result and the fact that (αM1 ∪ αA1 ) ∩ (αM2 ∪ αA2 ) = ∅ and αGi ⊆ αMi ∪ αAi for i = 1,2, we can derive the
equality:
Prσ(M1‖M2)[αA ](φG1 ∩ φG2) = Pr
σM1[αA1 ]
M1[αA1 ] (φG1) · Pr
σM2[αA2 ]
M2[αA2 ] (φG2)
= (1− PrσM1[αA1 ]M1[αA1 ] (φG1)) · (1− Pr
σM2[αA2 ]
M2[αA2 ] (φG2)
)
. (4)
Since (M1 ‖ M2)[αA], σ | ΨA , by construction of ΨA , it follows that (M1 ‖ M2)[αA], σ | ΨAi for i = 1,2, and hence
using Lemma 3(f) we have Mi[αAi ], σ M1[αA1 ] | ΨAi for i = 1,2. Combining this with the hypothesis 〈ΨAi 〉Mi fair〈ΨGi 〉 for
i = 1,2 and Lemma 2, it follows that:
Pr
σM1[αA1 ]
M1[αA1 ] (φG1) ∼ pG1 and Pr
σM2[αA2 ]
M2[αA2 ] (φG2) ∼ pG2
which, together with (4) and (3), yields the inequality:
Prσ(M1‖M2)[αA ](φG1 ∪ φG2) ∼ 1− (1− pG1) · (1− pG2) = pG1 + pG2 − pG1 · pG2
demonstrating that (M1 ‖ M2)[αA], σ | ΨG . Therefore, since σ was an arbitrary fair adversary of (M1 ‖ M2)[αA] for
which (M1 ‖M2)[αA], σ | ΨA , we have 〈ΨA〉M1‖M2fair〈ΨG 〉 as required. 
We remark that the rules in Theorem 6 can be adapted to prove properties with multiple, not single, predicates. This
can be achieved as discussed in Section 4.4 for the earlier rules.
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The third class of proof rules that we present in this section concerns the veriﬁcation of reward properties. We show
that, to prove properties of reward structures over a complete system, we can divide the reward structure into sub-structures
over the system’s components, prove properties for each sub-structure and then combine the results to prove properties of
the original reward structure over the complete system.
First, for reward structures ρ1 : αρ1 → R>0 and ρ2 : αρ2 → R>0, we deﬁne the composition ρ1+ρ2 : αρ1 ∪ αρ2 → R>0
such that, for any a ∈ αρ1 ∪ αρ2 :
(ρ1+ρ2)(a) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
ρ1(a)+ρ2(a) if a ∈ αρ1 ∩ αρ2 ,
ρ1(a) if a ∈ αρ1 \ αρ2 ,
ρ2(a) if a ∈ αρ2 \ αρ1 .
Using this deﬁnition we have the following result.
Theorem 7. If M1,M2 are PAs, ∼ ∈ {<,,,>} and, for i = 1,2, we have that ΨAi is a qmo-property and ΨGi = [ρGi ]∼rGi is a
single reward predicate, then the following proof rule holds:
〈ΨA1〉M1fair〈ΨG1〉
〈ΨA2〉M2fair〈ΨG2〉
〈ΨA〉M1 ‖M2fair〈ΨG〉
(Sum-Reward )
where ΨA = ΨA1 ∧ ΨA2 and ΨG = [ρG1 + ρG2 ]∼rG1+rG2 .
Proof. Suppose M1 and M2 are PAs, ∼ ∈ {<,,,>} and, for i = 1,2, we have that ΨAi is a qmo-property and
ΨGi = [φGi ]∼rGi is a single reward predicate such that 〈ΨAi 〉Mi fair〈ΨGi 〉. In addition, let ΨA = ΨA1 ∧ ΨA2 and ΨG =[ρG1 + ρG2 ]∼rG1+rG2 . Since αA = αA1 ∪ αA2 and the parallel composition operator is commutative and associative, using
Deﬁnition 7 we have:
(M1 ‖M2)[αA] =
(M1[αA1 ]) ‖ (M2[αA2 ]). (5)
Now, to show that 〈ΨA〉M1 ‖M2fair〈ΨG 〉, we consider any fair adversary σ of (M1 ‖ M2)[αA] such that (M1 ‖
M2)[αA], σ | ΨA . By Deﬁnition 9, we have:
ExpTotσ(M1‖M2)[αA ](ρ1 + ρ2) =
∫
π
(ρ1 + ρ2)(π)dPrσ(M1‖M2)[αA ]
=
∫
π
ρ1(π)dPr
σ
(M1‖M2)[αA ] +
∫
π
ρ2(π)dPr
σ
(M1‖M2)[αA ] rearranging
= ExpTotσ(M1‖M2)[αA ](ρ1) + ExpTotσ(M1‖M2)[αA ](ρ2) by Deﬁnition 9
= ExpTotσM1[αA1 ]‖M2[αA2 ](ρ1) + ExpTot
σ
M1[αA1 ]‖M2[αA2 ](ρ2) by (5)
= ExpTotσM1[αA1 ]M1[αA1 ] (ρ1) + ExpTot
σM2[αA2 ]
M2[αA2 ] (ρ2) by Lemma 3(d). (6)
Since (M1 ‖ M2)[αA], σ | ΨA , from construction of ΨA we have (M1 ‖ M2)[αA], σ | ΨAi for i = 1,2. Hence, us-
ing Lemma 3(d) and (5), it follows that M1[αAi ], σ Mi [αAi ] |ΨAi for i = 1,2, which, together with the fact that
〈ΨAi 〉Mi fair〈ΨGi 〉 for i = 1,2, implies:
ExpTot
σM1[αA1 ]
M1[αA1 ] (ρ1) ∼ rG1 and ExpTot
σM2[αA2 ]
M2[αA2 ] (ρ2) ∼ rG2 . (7)
Combining (6) and (7) we have:
ExpTotσ(M1‖M2)[αA ](ρ) ∼ rG1 + rG2 ,
and hence (M1 ‖ M2)[αA], σ | ΨG . Since σ was an arbitrary fair adversary of (M1 ‖ M2)[αA] for which (M1 ‖
M2)[αA], σ | ΨA , it follows that 〈ΨA〉M1‖M2fair〈ΨG〉 as required. 
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tion of reward properties. In particular, assuming αρi ⊆ αMi for i = 1,2, then as a special case of the rule we have:
M1 |fair [ρG1 ]∼rG1
M2 |fair [ρG2 ]∼rG2
M1 ‖M2 |fair [ρG1 + ρG2 ]∼rG1+rG2
.
6. Numerical assume-guarantee queries
Practical experience with probabilistic veriﬁcation suggests that it is often more instructive to analyse models using
numerical, rather than Boolean, queries. For example, instead of checking the correctness of a (lower-bounded) probabilistic
predicate [φ]p against a PA M for some bound p, it may be preferable to just directly compute the minimum probability
PrminM (φ) that φ is satisﬁed. This is because Pr
min
M (φ) gives the maximum value of p for which [φ]p is true. In similar
fashion, we can compute the maximum probability PrmaxM (φ) instead of checking an upper-bounded predicate [φ]p and the
minimum or maximum expected reward, ExpTotminM (ρ) or ExpTot
max
M (ρ), instead of a predicate [ρ]∼r over reward structure ρ .
In this section, we discuss how to formulate such numerical queries in the context of assume-guarantee reasoning.
Consider, ﬁrst, an assume-guarantee triple 〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG 〉 where ΨA = [φA]pA and ΨG = [φG ]pG are both lower-bounded
probabilistic predicates. Recall, from Deﬁnition 14, that this triple is said to be satisﬁed if, for any adversary (of class )
of PA M[αA] under which assumption ΨA is true, guarantee ΨG is also true. We can instead ask “what is the minimum
probability that φG holds, assuming that ΨA is true?”. This can be determined with a numerical multi-objective query of
the kind mentioned in Section 3.3:
PrminM[αA ](φG  ΨA) = inf
{
PrσM[αA ](φG)
∣∣ σ ∈ AdvM[αA ] ∧M[αA],σ | ΨA}
which can be determined with essentially the same procedure that checks whether assume-guarantee triple 〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG 〉
is true for a ﬁxed pG (i.e., as described in Proposition 3).
We call expressions such as the one above numerical assume-guarantee queries. The example above is equivalent to the
maximum value of pG for which 〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG〉 holds:
PrminM[αA ](φG  ΨA) = inf
{
PrσM[αA ](φG)
∣∣ σ ∈ AdvM[αA ] ∧M[αA],σ | ΨA}
= sup{pG ∈ [0,1] ∣∣ ∀σ ∈ AdvM[αA ] .M[αA],σ | ΨA → PrσM[αA ](φG)pG}
= sup{pG ∈ [0,1] ∣∣ 〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG〉}.
Optimal bounds. In the rest of this section, we will illustrate how to use numerical assume-guarantee queries, such as the
one above, in the context of our compositional proof rules. For simplicity, we will focus on proof rule (Asym-Safety) (see
Theorem 1) in which Ψ safeA = [φA]pA and Ψ safeG = [φG ]pG are single, lower-bounded probabilistic predicates. We can apply
similar ideas for our other proof rules. For clarity, in the remainder of this section, we will abbreviate Ψ safeA and Ψ
safe
G to ΨA
and ΨG , respectively.
Rule (Asym-Safety) allows us to verify that [φG ]pG holds in M1 ‖ M2 for some pG , i.e., it can be used to establish
lower bounds pG on the probability PrminM1‖M2 (φG). An appropriate numerical interpretation of this rule would therefore be
to instead determine the maximal lower bound pG , say p

G , for which [φG ]pG can be shown to hold using the (Asym-Safety)
rule (assuming the use of property φA in the assumption). This can be achieved as follows. First, we note that, from
Deﬁnition 14, it is clear that the highest value of pG for which 〈ΨA〉M2〈ΨG 〉 holds will be obtained by using the maximum
possible value of pA , which we will call p

A . For rule (Asym-Safety) to be applicable, p

A is equal to Pr
min
M1 (φA), since any
higher value of pA will result in the ﬁrst premise failing to hold.
Now, to ﬁnd pG , we use a numerical assume-guarantee query that computes the maximum value of pG for which
〈ΨA〉M2〈ΨG 〉 holds, assuming that the bound pA in ΨA is taken to be pA . Reasoning as above, this can be obtained
through the multi-objective numerical query PrminM2[αA ](φG  [φA]pA ). In summary, we have a numerical interpretation of
the rule (Asym-Safety) which reduces to a two-step procedure, with one instance of (standard) model checking and one of
multi-objective model checking:
(i) pA := PrminM1 (φA);
(ii) pG := PrminM2[αA ](φG  [φA]pA ).
Through similar reasoning, we can determine either maximal lower bounds, or minimal upper bounds, for many of the other
rules presented in this paper, where the property being proved is a single quantitative predicate.
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(Asym-Safety) to verify the probabilistic safety property [φG ]0.98 on the parallel composition of the PAs Ms and Md from
Example 1 (see Fig. 1). Again, we let M1 =Ms and M2 =Md , and use an assumption based on regular safety property φA .
Firstly, we compute pA := PrminMs (φA), which, as shown earlier in Example 3, gives p

A = 0.8. Secondly, we compute pG :=
PrminMd[αA ](φG  [φA]0.8), which, using Lemma 1, equals 1− PrmaxM′ (errG  [errA]0.2) on the product M′ =Md ⊗AerrφA ⊗
AerrφG shown in Fig. 4. This gives p

G = 0.98, which shows that the lower bound of 0.98 on the probability PrminMs‖Md (φG)
shown in Example 4 is indeed the highest lower bound that we can obtain with assumption φA using the (Asym-Safety)
rule.
Parameterised queries. Above, we found the maximum lower bound on PrminM1‖M2 (φG) that can be shown using an as-
sumption of the form [φA]pA and rule (Asym-Safety). Let us now consider the reverse problem, i.e., ﬁnding which values
of pA suﬃce to guarantee that M1 ‖M2 | [φG ]pG for some ﬁxed threshold pG . Let us further assume that component
M1 is parameterised by a variable x in such a way that varying x changes the probability of M1 satisfying the property φA
used in the assumption. This may in turn affect the probability of φG holding on M1 ‖M2.
To give a simple illustration, consider the PA Ms from the running example (see Fig. 1(a)), representing a sensor that
may fail to send a warn message upon detection of a system failure. Let parameter x be the probability that warn is not sent
(x = 0.2 in the running example). For the assumption φA (“warn occurs before shutdown”), we then have PrminMs (φA) = 1− x.
However, varying x may simultaneously worsen some other performance measure or cost. For example, it may only be
possible to reduce the probability of a failure in the sensor by replacing it with a more reliable, but more expensive,
component.
In this case, it is natural to ask for the minimum value of pA , say p

A , such that we can guarantee M1 ‖M2 | [φG ]pG
is true. This means determining the minimum value of pA such that 〈[φA]pA 〉M2〈[φG ]pG 〉 holds. This can again be com-
puted using a numerical multi-objective query as pA := PrmaxM2[αA ](φA  [φG ]<pG ) since, by deﬁnition of numerical queries:
PrmaxM2[αA ]
(
φA  [φG ]<pG
)
= sup{PrσM2[αA ](φA) ∣∣ σ ∈ AdvM2[αA ] ∧ PrσM2[αA ](φG)<pG}
= inf{pA ∈ [0,1] ∣∣ ∀σ ∈ AdvM2[αA ] . PrσM2[αA ](φG)<pG → PrσM2[αA ](φA)<pA} rearranging
= inf{pA ∈ [0,1] ∣∣ ∀σ ∈ AdvM2[αA ] . PrσM2[αA ](φA)pA → PrσM2[αA ](φG)pG} rearranging
= inf{pA ∈ [0,1] ∣∣ 〈[φA]pA 〉M2〈[φG ]pG 〉} by Deﬁnition 14.
Recall that, to check a standard (non-numerical) assume-guarantee triple (see Proposition 3), we in fact determine whether
it is false, by checking for the existence of an adversary σ of M2[αA] that satisﬁes the assumption [φA]pA but does not
satisfy the guarantee [φG ]pG . Analogously, the numerical query given above computes pA as the maximum probability of
satisfying φA over all adversaries σ of M2[αA] for which [φG ]pG is not true. We then know that, for any value of pA that
is strictly less than pA , there is such an adversary σ . Hence, the assume-guarantee triple is true for any pA  p

A and p

A is
the minimum value that we can use for pA .
Finally, having found pA , we can choose a suitable value for the parameter x of PA M1 which ensures that the assump-
tion [φA]pA holds. It some cases, determining the possible values of x might be straightforward (such as in the example
below); in others, we might use, for example, parametric probabilistic model checking techniques for PAs [37,38].
Example 7. Let us return to the PAs from Example 6 but, as suggested in the text above, assume that the probability of PA
Ms (see Fig. 1(a)) moving from state s0 to s1 upon taking action detect is x, not 0.2. Thus, PrminMs (φA) = 1 − x. Let us also
assume that we wish to guarantee that the full system Ms‖Md satisﬁes [φG ]0.97 (note that this bound of 0.97 is lower
than the bound of 0.98 checked in Example 6). Proceeding as described above, we compute pA := PrmaxMd[αA ](φA  [φG ]<0.97)
which yields a value of 0.7. This means that, to verify [φG ]0.97 compositionally, it suﬃces to use the assumption [φA]0.7
and, from above, this requires that x 0.3.
Pareto queries. We can take the idea of numerical assume-guarantee queries one step further by using the class of Pareto
queries [33], mentioned previously in Section 3.3. Earlier in this section, we looked at two ways of investigating the values
of pA and pG for which the assume-guarantee triple 〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG 〉 holds: we considered the largest value of pG that we
can guarantee for a given pA and the smallest value of pA that is required to guarantee a ﬁxed pG . More generally, it is
useful to examine the trade-off between these two values, by determining the set of all possible values of pA, pG for which
〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG 〉 holds.
In fact, we are interested in maximising the value of pG (to give us as strong a guarantee as possible) and minimising
the value of pA (to permit the use of an assumption that is as weak as possible). So, as explained below, we can study
Pareto curves for these values. Intuitively, these are sets of pairs (pA, pG) such that 〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG 〉 holds, but increasing pG
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any further would necessitate also increasing pA to ensure that 〈ΨA〉M〈ΨG 〉 is still true and, conversely, decreasing pA
would require a lower value of pG .
In a similar fashion to the numerical query used to compute pA in the section above, we actually use a query that
searches for adversaries that make the assume-guarantee triple false, namely those for which [φA]pA is true but [φG ]pG is
not true. More precisely, we use a Pareto query which maximises the probability PrσM2[αA ](φA) and minimises the probability
PrσM2[αA ](φG). The set of achievable points, which we denote Xa ⊆ [0,1]2, contains all pairs (pA, pG) such that:
• there exists an adversary σ of M2[αA] for which PrσM2[αA ](φA)pA and PrσM2[αA ](φG)pG
and the Pareto curve is the biggest set Xp ⊆ Xa such that, for each pair of values (pA, pG) ∈ Xp :
• there is no other (p′A, p′G ) ∈ Xp such that either p′ApA and p′G<pG , or p′A>pA and p′GpG .
We can then determine from the Pareto curve Xp the values pA and pG for which the assume-guarantee triple holds. More
precisely, 〈[φA]pA 〉M2〈[φG ]pG 〉 holds for (pA, pG) if and only if there is some pair (p−A , p+G ) ∈ Xp such that pA  p−A or
pG  p+G .
Example 8. We return to the compositional veriﬁcation problem studied in Examples 6 and 7, and study the values of
pA and pG for which 〈[φA]pA 〉Md〈[φG ]pG 〉 holds. Following the procedure outlined above, we obtain the Pareto curve
which maximises PrσMd[αA ](φA) and minimises Pr
σ
Md[αA ](φG). This is shown in Fig. 6. The set Xa of achievable points is
shown shaded grey and the black dashed line represents the Pareto curve Xp .
Thus, for each point (pA, pG) ∈ Xp , there is an adversary of Md[αA] for which pA = PrσMd[αA ](φA) and pG =
PrσMd[αA ](φG). For this simple example, we can ﬁnd such adversaries by inspection of the PA Md[αA]. Recall that, in this
example, αA = {warn, shutdown} ⊆ αMd , so Md[αA] is identical to Md , which can be seen in Fig. 1(b). Consider the set of
(randomised) adversaries σy (for y ∈ [0,1]) which, in state s0, choose action warn with probability y and action shutdown
with probability 1− y. For adversary σy , this results in a probability of y for φA and 1− 0.1 · (1− y) = 0.9+ 0.1 · y for φG .
Varying y ∈ [0,1] gives the Pareto curve.
From Fig. 6, we can conclude that 〈[φA]pA 〉Md〈[φG ]pG 〉 holds for any values of pA, pG such that pG  0.9+ 0.1 · pA .
Notice that the Pareto curve allows us to determine values for the numerical queries used in Examples 6 and 7 (without
any further computation). For example, if we know that pA  0.8 (as in Example 6), then the maximum value of pG for
which we can show [φG ]pG to hold is 0.9 + 0.1 · 0.8 = 0.98 (see also the grey dotted line in Fig. 6). Alternatively, if we
want pG = 0.97 (as in Example 7), then we must have pA  (0.97− 0.9)/0.1 = 0.7.
7. Implementation and case studies
We have implemented our compositional veriﬁcation approach by extending the probabilistic model checker PRISM [4].
Recall that, using the rules presented in Sections 4 and 5, veriﬁcation requires both (standard) model checking of ω-regular
or reward-based properties and multi-objective model checking. PRISM already provided support for verifying probabilis-
tic automata against the logic LTL and expected total reward properties. Furthermore, it can easily verify the action-based
safety or ω-regular properties used in this paper, by encoding the required deterministic ﬁnite or Rabin automata directly in
PRISM’s modelling language. For multi-objective model checking, we extended PRISM with an implementation of the tech-
niques in [14,15]. This requires the solution of Linear Programming (LP) problems, for which we use the ECLiPSe Constraint
Logic Programming system with the COIN-OR CBC solver, implementing a branch-and-cut algorithm.
This section evaluates the performance and scalability of our techniques on two large case studies: the randomised
consensus algorithm of Aspnes and Herlihy [39]; and a model of the Zeroconf protocol [29]. All models and properties
are available online [40]. This includes the automata that are needed to form the assumptions used in our compositional
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structure and the properties that are being checked. An important direction of future work in this area is the automatic
generation of such counterexamples. Some progress has already been made on this topic, using algorithmic learning to
generate probabilistic safety properties to be used as assumptions [19,20].
The next two sections describe in more detail how we veriﬁed the two case studies compositionally; in the following
section, we summarise the experimental results.
7.1. Aspnes and Herlihy’s randomised consensus algorithm
The ﬁrst case study we consider is the randomised consensus algorithm of Aspnes and Herlihy [39]. The algorithm allows
N processes in a distributed network to reach a consensus and employs, in each round, a shared coin protocol parameterised
by a constant K and the number of processes N . Each shared coin protocol is based on a random walk where the boundaries
of the walk are derived from the values of K and N .
The model of the algorithm used here is based on [41] and comprises one PA for each process and one for the shared
coin protocol used in each round. Although the number of rounds of the protocol can be unbounded, the properties that we
check here relate only to the behaviour within a ﬁnite number of rounds R . The combined PA is:
(P1 ‖ P2 ‖ . . . ‖ PN) ‖ (SCP1 ‖| SCP2 ‖| . . . ‖| SCPR)
where Pi is the PA corresponding to process i, SCP j is the PA corresponding to the shared coin protocol used in round j
and we write ||| to denote parallel composition between PAs with disjoint alphabets. Although each shared chain protocol
SCP j does interact with the N processes, there is no communication between the protocols themselves, i.e., the shared coin
protocols for each round are independent. This lets us use the asynchronous proof rules introduced in Section 5.2.
We analyse the following two properties:
(i) the minimum probability that the processes decide by round R;
(ii) the maximum expected number of steps required in the ﬁrst R rounds.
We adopt the numerical approach described in Section 6, computing lower/upper bounds on these values, rather than
proving that they are above or below a given threshold.
Property (i) can be represented by a probabilistic safety property. We use the rule (Asym-Safety), in conjunction with
the rule (Async-Safety), to establish the required assumptions. More precisely, compositional veriﬁcation is achieved by:
• calculating the minimum probability that the coin protocols in earlier rounds return the same coin value for all pro-
cesses, and then combining these results using rule (Async-Safety) to prove a probabilistic safety property satisﬁed by
the (asynchronous) composition of the coin protocols;
• using this probabilistic safety property as the assumption for an application of the (Asym-Safety) rule, yielding the ﬁnal
property of interest on the combined system, namely, the minimum probability that agreement is reached by round R .
Compositional veriﬁcation of property (ii) is performed by:
• splitting the reward structure for the property into several parts (one for the N processes and one for each coin protocol)
and then using rule (Async-Quant) to determine an upper bound on the maximum total expected value for each one;
• combining these results, using the (Sum-Reward) rule, to compute an upper bound on the maximum total reward.
7.2. The Zeroconf protocol
The second case study is the Zeroconf protocol [42], for conﬁguring IP addresses in a local network. We use the model
from [29], composed of two PAs: one representing a new host joining the network and the second representing the envi-
ronment, i.e. the existing network. The model is parameterised by K , the number of messages (“probes”) that the new host
sends before using its chosen IP address. We consider the following four properties:
(i) the minimum probability that the new host employs a fresh IP address;
(ii) the minimum probability that the new host is conﬁgured by time T ;
(iii) the minimum probability that the protocol terminates;
(iv) the minimum and maximum expected time for the protocol to terminate.
Properties (i) and (ii) are probabilistic safety properties, which are veriﬁed compositionally by:
• applying the rule (Circ-Safety), where the ﬁrst and second assumptions concern the new host and environment, re-
spectively, and the ﬁrst assumption is a qualitative (probability 1) safety property.
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Experimental results for the randomised consensus case study.
Model (Property) Non-compositional Compositional
[parameters] States Time (s) Result LP size Time (s) Result
2 processes
(min.
probability
decide)
[R K ]
3 2 5158 0.6 0.108333 1427 0.9 0.108333b
3 20 40,294 42.2 0.012500 1427 3.9 0.012500b
4 2 20,886 1.4 0.011736 3217 2.9 0.011736b
4 20 166,614 129.1 0.000156 3217 4.4 0.000156b
5 2 83,798 2.9 0.001271 6797 1.4 0.001271b
5 20 671,894 472.5 0.000002 6797 5.9 0.000002b
3 processes
(min.
probability
decide)
[R K ]
3 2 1,418,545 3589.0 0.229092 49,113 23.5 0.229092b
3 12 16,674,145a time-out – 49,113 34.1 0.041643b
3 20 39,827,233a time-out – 49,113 66.9 0.024960b
4 2 150,487,585 20,372 0.052483 174,193 200.1 0.052483b
4 12 1,053,762,385a mem-out – 174,193 210.6 0.001734b
4 20 2,028,200,209a mem-out – 174,193 243.4 0.000623b
2 processes
(max. expected
steps)
[R K ]
3 2 1806 0.2 89.00 974 1.2 89.65
3 20 11,598 16.6 5057 5775 3.3 5057
4 2 7478 0.7 89.00 2184 3.1 98.42
4 20 51,830 84.0 5057 5775 11.6 5120
5 2 30,166 1.7 89.00 4604 4.9 100.1
5 20 212,758 348.0 5057 5775 15.6 5121
3 processes
(max. expected
steps)
[R K ]
3 2 114,559 12.9 212.0 10,294 9.4 214.3
3 12 507,919 865.9 4352 59,254 210.1 4352
3 20 822,607a 3396.0 11,552 98,422 650.2 11,552
4 2 3,669,649 406.5 212.0 82.9 118.9 260.3
4 12 29,797,249a mem-out – 116,658 475.1 4533
4 20 65,629,249a mem-out – 116,658 1231.9 11,840
a These models can be constructed, but not model checked, in PRISM.
b Results for probabilistic safety properties are shown as maximum probabilities of error so actual values are these subtracted from 1.
For properties (iii) and (iv), veriﬁcation is performed by:
• applying the rule (Circ-Quant), where the ﬁrst assumption is a either a qualitative safety or qualitative liveness prop-
erty, about the new host, and the second assumption is a probabilistic ω-regular property, concerning the environment.
7.3. Experimental results
In Tables 1 and 2, we summarise the experimental results for the randomised consensus and Zeroconf case studies,
respectively. Experiments were run on a 2.8 GHz PC with 8 GB RAM. Any run exceeding a time-limit of 6 hours was
disregarded. The tables show the time taken for veriﬁcation, performed both compositionally and non-compositionally.
For the former, we proceed as described as above, using PRISM to check each individual model checking problem. For
the latter, we also use PRISM, selecting its fastest available model checking engine. To give an indication of the scale of
the veriﬁcation tasks performed, the tables also show, for the non-compositional case, the size (number of states) of the
PA for the composed system and, for the compositional case, the size (number of variables) of the largest LP problem
solved for multi-objective model checking. Finally, the table includes the (numerical) results obtained from veriﬁcation. For
probabilistic safety properties, we show the maximum probabilities of violating the property, so the actual values are these
subtracted from 1.
One the whole, compositional veriﬁcation performs very well. For the randomised consensus models (Table 1), on all but
the smallest examples, it is faster than the non-compositional case, often signiﬁcantly so, and is able to scale up to larger
models. In particular, this allows the veriﬁcation of several models for which it is infeasible with conventional techniques
(those marked with “mem-out” in the table). For the Zeroconf example (Table 2), we again see improved times for the
compositional approach on the ﬁrst property. For the other properties, the times for the two approaches are closer, but
non-compositional veriﬁcation is slightly faster. Encouragingly, the times for compositional veriﬁcation tend to grow more
slowly with model size. Since the time required for this is usually dominated by the time to solve LP problems, we anticipate
better performance through enhancements to the underlying LP solver and optimisations for our implementation that will
reduce LP problem sizes. In fact, LP solution represents the limiting factor with respect to the sizes of models that our
techniques can be applied to, so such improvements will also help improve the scalability of compositional veriﬁcation.
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Experimental results for Zeroconf case study.
Property Non-compositional Compositional
[parameters] States Time (s) Result LP size Time (s) Result
min. probability
fresh [K ]
2 91,041 7.1 2.0e−5 4,216 3.1 3.1e−4a
4 313,541 21.1 7.3e−7 13,103 6.4 3.1e−4a
6 811,290 58.6 2.6e−8 24,928 16.0 2.5e−4a
8 1,892,952 141.5 9.5e−10 41,224 31.8 9.0e−6a
min. probability
conﬁgured by T
[K T ]
2 10 665,567 14.0 5.9e−5 38,759 20.0 2.1e−4a
2 14 1,061,771 21.3 2.0e−8 63,188 32.4 8.1e−8a
4 10 976,247 29.6 3.3e+0 47,577 34.3 3.3e−1a
4 14 2,288,771 49.6 7.0e−5 105,685 74.3 3.1e−4a
min. probability
terminate [K ]
2 13,474 1.4 1.0 151,503 15.3 1.0
4 57,960 5.3 1.0 151,503 15.6 1.0
6 125,697 9.5 1.0 151,503 16.1 1.0
8 163,229 10.7 1.0 151,503 16.6 1.0
min. expected
time [K ]
2 13,474 1.0 9.419 151,503 14.9 8.90
4 57,960 3.5 13.49 151,503 15.1 16.90
6 125,697 7.4 17.49 151,503 15.2 12.90
8 163,229 10.6 21.49 151,503 15.5 20.90
max. expected
time [K ]
2 13,474 0.9 10.22 151,503 15.2 12.00
4 57,960 3.0 14.28 151,503 15.5 17.33
6 125,697 6.8 18.28 151,503 15.9 22.67
8 163,229 9.9 22.28 151,503 16.3 28.00
a Results for probabilistic safety properties are show as maximum probabilities of error so actual values are these subtracted from 1.
Lastly we also comment on the results obtained from assume-guarantee veriﬁcation. As mentioned earlier, we use the
approach discussed in Section 6 to obtain numerical values for each property of interest, representing a lower or upper
bound on the actual value of the property. We observe that the bounds obtained using our assume-guarantee approach are
generally quite precise. In fact, for several properties, the bounds are tight, matching the actual values exactly.
8. Conclusions
We have presented new techniques for compositional veriﬁcation of probabilistic automata, based on the assume-
guarantee paradigm. Our techniques can be used to verify probabilistic ω-regular properties (including the special case
of probabilistic safety properties) and expected total reward properties. The key novelty of our approach is the use of multi-
objective model checking, for which eﬃcient techniques exist. We have presented a variety of assume-guarantee proof rules
and also discussed how to formulate and evaluate numerical veriﬁcation queries in a compositional manner. In contrast to
existing work in this area, our techniques can be implemented eﬃciently and we demonstrate successful results on several
large case studies.
There are several interesting directions for future work. For the fragment of our framework that uses probabilistic safety
properties, algorithmic learning techniques have already been developed to automatically produce the assumptions required
for compositional reasoning [19,20]. This work adapts the L* algorithm for learning regular languages to the problem of
synthesising assumptions expressed as probabilistic safety properties. It would be interesting to extend these methods to
the more general class of properties considered in this paper, perhaps using techniques for learning of ω-automata [43,44].
Another topic to investigate is that of completeness. Some assume-guarantee frameworks are complete in the sense that,
if a property of a composed system is true, then there must exist an assumption that can be used to verify it compositionally.
For example, this is trivially true for frameworks in which assumptions are expressed in the same manner as the models
themselves: then, completeness can be shown by using the component itself as the assumption that represents it. In our
approach, the formalisms for components (probabilistic automata) and assumptions (qmo-properties) are distinct, so this
argument is not applicable. We would like to investigate for which classes of models and properties our framework can be
shown to be complete.
Finally, we would also like to consider assume-guarantee techniques for richer classes of models such as probabilistic
timed automata and continuous-time variants of probabilistic automata, such as interactive Markov chains [45] or Markov
automata [46]. In order to adapt the multi-objective model checking approach used in this paper, the ﬁrst step will be to
develop eﬃcient multi-objective techniques for timed properties of such models.
Acknowledgments
This work was part funded by ERC Advanced Grant VERIWARE, EPSRC grant EP/F001096/1 and European Commission FP7
projects CONNECT (IST 231167) and HIERATIC (316705). The authors are also grateful to the anonymous referees for their
helpful comments.
64 M. Kwiatkowska et al. / Information and Computation 232 (2013) 38–65References
[1] A. Bianco, L. de Alfaro, Model checking of probabilistic and nondeterministic systems, in: P. Thiagarajan (Ed.), Proc. 15th Conference on Foundations of
Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science, FSTTCS’95, in: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., vol. 1026, Springer, 1995, pp. 499–513.
[2] C. Courcoubetis, M. Yannakakis, Markov decision processes and regular events, in: M. Paterson (Ed.), Proc. 17th International Colloquium on Automata,
Languages and Programming, ICALP’90, in: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., vol. 443, Springer, 1990, pp. 336–349.
[3] L. de Alfaro, Formal veriﬁcation of probabilistic systems, PhD thesis, Stanford University, 1997.
[4] M. Kwiatkowska, G. Norman, D. Parker, PRISM 4.0: Veriﬁcation of probabilistic real-time systems, in: G. Gopalakrishnan, S. Qadeer (Eds.), Proc. 23rd
International Conference on Computer Aided Veriﬁcation, CAV’11, in: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., vol. 6806, Springer, 2011, pp. 585–591.
[5] F. Ciesinski, C. Baier, Liquor: A tool for qualitative and quantitative linear time analysis of reactive systems, in: Proc. 3rd International Conference on
Quantitative Evaluation of Systems, QEST’06, IEEE CS Press, 2006, pp. 131–132.
[6] C. Jones, Tentative steps towards a development method for interfering programs, ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. 5 (1983) 596–619.
[7] C. Pasareanu, D. Giannakopoulou, M. Bobaru, J. Cobleigh, H. Barringer, Learning to divide and conquer: Applying the L* algorithm to automate assume-
guarantee reasoning, Form. Methods Syst. Des. 32 (2008) 175–205.
[8] R. Segala, Modelling and veriﬁcation of randomized distributed real time systems, PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995.
[9] R. Segala, N. Lynch, Probabilistic simulations for probabilistic processes, Nord. J. Comput. 2 (1995) 250–273.
[10] A. Pogosyants, R. Segala, N. Lynch, Veriﬁcation of the randomized consensus algorithm of Aspnes and Herlihy: A case study, Distrib. Comput. 13 (2000)
155–186.
[11] R. Segala, A compositional trace-based semantics for probabilistic automata, in: I. Lee, S. Smolka (Eds.), Proc. 6th International Conference on Concur-
rency Theory, CONCUR’95, in: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., vol. 962, Springer, 1995, pp. 234–248.
[12] L. de Alfaro, T. Henzinger, R. Jhala, Compositional methods for probabilistic systems, in: K. Larsen, M. Nielsen (Eds.), Proc. 12th International Conference
on Concurrency Theory, CONCUR’01, in: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., vol. 2154, Springer, 2001, pp. 351–365.
[13] L. Cheung, N. Lynch, R. Segala, F. Vaandrager, Switched probabilistic I/O automata, in: Proc. 1st International Colloquium on Theoretical Aspects of
Computing, ICTAC’04, in: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., vol. 3407, Springer, 2004, pp. 494–510.
[14] K. Etessami, M. Kwiatkowska, M. Vardi, M. Yannakakis, Multi-objective model checking of Markov decision processes, Log. Methods Comput. Sci. 4
(2008) 1–21.
[15] V. Forejt, M. Kwiatkowska, G. Norman, D. Parker, H. Qu, Quantitative multi-objective veriﬁcation for probabilistic systems, in: P. Abdulla, K. Leino
(Eds.), Proc. 17th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, TACAS’11, in: Lect. Notes Comput.
Sci., vol. 6605, Springer, 2011, pp. 112–127.
[16] R. Alur, T. Henzinger, Reactive modules, in: Proc. 11th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, LICS’96, IEEE CS Press, 1996, pp. 207–218.
[17] M. Kwiatkowska, G. Norman, D. Parker, H. Qu, Assume-guarantee veriﬁcation for probabilistic systems, in: J. Esparza, R. Majumdar (Eds.), Proc. 16th
International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, TACAS’10, in: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., vol. 6105,
Springer, 2010, pp. 23–37.
[18] K. Etessami, M. Kwiatkowska, M. Vardi, M. Yannakakis, Multi-objective model checking of Markov decision processes, in: O. Grumberg, M. Huth (Eds.),
Proc. 13th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, TACAS’07, in: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci.,
vol. 4424, Springer, 2007, pp. 50–65.
[19] L. Feng, M. Kwiatkowska, D. Parker, Compositional veriﬁcation of probabilistic systems using learning, in: Proc. 7th International Conference on Quan-
titative Evaluation of SysTems, QEST’10, IEEE CS Press, 2010, pp. 133–142.
[20] L. Feng, M. Kwiatkowska, D. Parker, Automated learning of probabilistic assumptions for compositional reasoning, in: D. Giannakopoulou, F. Orejas
(Eds.), Proc. 14th International Conference on Fundamental Approaches to Software Engineering, FASE’11, in: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., vol. 6603,
Springer, 2011, pp. 2–17.
[21] A. Komuravelli, C. Pasareanu, E. Clarke, Assume-guarantee abstraction reﬁnement for probabilistic systems, in: P. Madhusudan, S. Seshia (Eds.), Proc.
24th International Conference on Computer Aided Veriﬁcation, CAV’12, in: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., vol. 7358, Springer, 2012, pp. 310–326.
[22] J.A. Kumar, S. Vasudevan, Automatic compositional reasoning for probabilistic model checking of hardware designs, in: Proc. 7th International Confer-
ence on Quantitative Evaluation of SysTems, QEST’10, IEEE CS Press, 2010, pp. 143–152.
[23] B. Delahaye, B. Caillaud, A. Legay, Probabilistic contracts: A compositional reasoning methodology for the design of stochastic systems, in: Proc. 10th
International Conference on Application of Concurrency to System Design, ACSD’10, IEEE CS Press, 2010, pp. 223–232.
[24] K. Chatterjee, L. de Alfaro, M. Faella, T. Henzinger, R. Majumdar, M. Stoelinga, Compositional quantitative reasoning, in: Proc. 3rd International Confer-
ence on Quantitative Evaluation of Systems, QEST’06, IEEE CS Press, 2006, pp. 179–188.
[25] A. David, K.G. Larsen, A. Legay, U. Nyman, A. Wasowski, ECDAR: An environment for compositional design and analysis of real time systems, in:
A. Bouajjani, W.-N. Chin (Eds.), Proc. 8th International Symposium on Automated Technology for Veriﬁcation and Analysis, ATVA’10, in: Lect. Notes
Comput. Sci., vol. 6252, Springer, 2010, pp. 365–370.
[26] J. Kemeny, J. Snell, A. Knapp, Denumerable Markov Chains, 2nd edition, Springer, 1976.
[27] W. Thomas, Automata on inﬁnite objects, in: J. van Leeuwen (Ed.), Handbook of Theoretical Computer Science, volume B: Formal Models and Semantics,
Elsevier, 1990, pp. 133–192.
[28] V. Forejt, M. Kwiatkowska, G. Norman, D. Parker, Automated veriﬁcation techniques for probabilistic systems, in: M. Bernardo, V. Issarny (Eds.), Formal
Methods for Eternal Networked Software Systems, SFM’11, in: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., vol. 6659, Springer, 2011, pp. 53–113.
[29] M. Kwiatkowska, G. Norman, D. Parker, J. Sproston, Performance analysis of probabilistic timed automata using digital clocks, Form. Methods Syst. Des.
29 (2006) 33–78.
[30] C. Courcoubetis, M. Yannakakis, Markov decision processes and regular events, IEEE Trans. Autom. Control 43 (1998) 1399–1418.
[31] M. Puterman, Markov Decision Processes: Discrete Stochastic Dynamic Programming, John Wiley and Sons, 1994.
[32] C. Baier, J.-P. Katoen, Principles of Model Checking, MIT Press, 2008.
[33] V. Forejt, M. Kwiatkowska, D. Parker, Pareto curves for probabilistic model checking, in: S. Chakraborty, M. Mukund (Eds.), Proc. 10th International
Symposium on Automated Technology for Veriﬁcation and Analysis, ATVA’12, in: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., vol. 7561, Springer, 2012, pp. 317–332.
[34] C. Baier, M. Kwiatkowska, Model checking for a probabilistic branching time logic with fairness, Distrib. Comput. 11 (1998) 125–155.
[35] C. Baier, M. Größer, F. Ciesinski, Quantitative analysis under fairness constraints, in: Proc. 7th International Symposium on Automated Technology for
Veriﬁcation and Analysis, ATVA’09, in: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., vol. 5799, Springer, 2009, pp. 135–150.
[36] H. Hansen, M. Kwiatkowska, H. Qu, Partial order reduction for model checking Markov decision processes under unconditional fairness, in: Proc. 8th
International Conference on Quantitative Evaluation of SysTems, QEST’11, IEEE CS Press, 2011, pp. 203–212.
[37] E.M. Hahn, H. Hermanns, L. Zhang, Probabilistic reachability for parametric Markov models, Int. J. Softw. Tools Technol. Transf. 13 (2011) 3–19.
[38] T. Chen, E.M. Hahn, T. Han, M. Kwiatkowska, H. Qu, L. Zhang, Model repair for Markov decision processes, in: Proc. 7th International Symposium on
Theoretical Aspects of Software Engineering, TASE’13, IEEE CS Press, 2013, pp. 85–92.
[39] J. Aspnes, M. Herlihy, Fast randomized consensus using shared memory, J. Algorithms 15 (1990) 441–460.
[40] http://www.prismmodelchecker.org/ﬁles/ic-probag/, 2013.
M. Kwiatkowska et al. / Information and Computation 232 (2013) 38–65 65[41] M. Kwiatkowska, G. Norman, R. Segala, Automated veriﬁcation of a randomized distributed consensus protocol using Cadence SMV and PRISM, in:
G. Berry, H. Comon, A. Finkel (Eds.), Proc. 13th International Conference on Computer Aided Veriﬁcation, CAV’01, in: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., vol. 2102,
Springer, 2001, pp. 194–206.
[42] S. Cheshire, B. Adoba, E. Gutterman, Dynamic conﬁguration of IPv4 link local addresses, available from http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3927.txt, 2005.
[43] A. Farzan, Y.-F. Chen, E. Clarke, Y.-K. Tsay, B.-Y. Wang, Extending automated compositional veriﬁcation to the full class of omega-regular languages,
in: Proc. 14th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems, TACAS’08, in: Lect. Notes Comput. Sci.,
vol. 4963, Springer, 2008, pp. 2–17.
[44] S. Chaki, A. Gurﬁnkel, Automated assume-guarantee reasoning for omega-regular systems and speciﬁcations, in: Proc. 2nd NASA Formal Methods
Symposium, NFM’10, pp. 57–66.
[45] H. Hermanns, Interactive Markov Chains and the Quest for Quantiﬁed Quality, Lect. Notes Comput. Sci., vol. 2428, Springer, 2002.
[46] C. Eisentraut, H. Hermanns, L. Zhang, On probabilistic automata in continuous time, in: Proc. 25th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer
Science, LICS’10, IEEE CS Press, 2010, pp. 342–351.
